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The Fourth Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, 
have a long history.  At the very core stands the right of a man to 
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion.1 
olice employ drug-detection dogs in public locations, such as 
airports, as a quick means of determining whether luggage 
contains contraband.2  In United States v. Place, the U.S. Supreme 
Court explained that the use of drug-detection dogs to sniff luggage in 
a public location was not a “search” under the Fourth Amendment 
because of the accuracy and limited intrusiveness of the canine sniff 
technique.3  The Place Court likely reached this conclusion because 
 
1 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). 
2 See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983) (recommending use of the canine 
sniff technique because “[a] negative result [from a canine sniff] would have freed Royer 
in short order; a positive result would have resulted in his justifiable arrest on probable 
cause”). 
3 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (observing that a canine sniff of 
luggage located in a “public place” was not a search, explaining that “[w]e are aware of no 
P 
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the background understanding of the day was that detection dogs were 
the ideal sensing tool because, in the rare case of a mistake, the dog’s 
error was actually a false negative.4  Therefore, any mistake by a 
drug-detection dog worked to the benefit of the luggage owner. 
Despite recent evidence that drug-detection dogs are inaccurate a 
surprising percentage of the time, the Court in Illinois v. Caballes 
extended the warrantless use of the canine sniff technique to a 
lawfully stopped vehicle.5  The impact of the Caballes decision has 
been felt far beyond vehicle sniffs, however.  Lower courts have 
taken the Place and Caballes decisions as a signal that canine sniffs 
are per se nonsearches and that it is therefore permissible to conduct 
suspicionless canine sniffs of homes.  Without a warrant requirement, 
or even a suspicion requirement, police are thereby granted unfettered 
discretion to conduct dragnet investigations at housing projects or 
other multidwelling locations, such as apartment complexes, or to 
arbitrarily select sniff locations.6  A positive canine alert may then be 
used to obtain a warrant to enter the home and physically search for 
drugs or to target a home for consent-based entry. 
Despite the visceral offensiveness of potential dragnet or selective 
police investigations involving the home, all lower federal courts that 
have considered the issue, aside from the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, have concluded that a canine sniff of a private 
home is not a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.  Therefore, no 
warrant, or even suspicion, is required to perform the canine sniff.7  
 
other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the 
information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure”). 
4 See infra notes 151–52 (discussing Place’s apparent assumptions concerning the 
accuracy of detection dogs).  Because Place’s canine sniff discussion was only two 
paragraphs in length, referenced no legal or scientific authority, and the canine sniff issue 
was neither briefed nor argued to the Court, discussion of the Place Court’s assumptions is 
necessarily speculative.  See Place, 462 U.S. at 719 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
5 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). 
6 See People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (N.Y. 1990) (finding that the canine sniff 
of a home was a “search” under the New York Constitution).  “To hold otherwise, we 
believe would raise the specter of the police roaming indiscriminately through the 
corridors of public housing projects with trained dogs in search of drugs. . . . Such an 
Orwellian notion would be repugnant . . . .”  Id. (citations omitted); see also Hoop v. State, 
909 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (observing that “[a]llowing random searches, or 
searches of those individuals whom the officers hope to find in possession of incriminating 
evidence gives excessive discretion to engage in fishing expeditions” (quoting Litchfield 
v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 364 (Ind. 2005))). 
7 Compare United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding a 
warrantless canine sniff under an apartment door to be a “search”), with United States v. 
Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding the location of a canine sniff “irrelevant” 
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This Article challenges the legitimacy of that conclusion and argues 
that a canine sniff of a private residence—a location that is afforded 
stringent Fourth Amendment protection—is a “search” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
The canine home-sniff issue is emblematic of a more generalized 
Fourth Amendment crossroads that the Court must surely face.  If the 
legitimacy of our expectations of privacy is determined primarily by 
the legality or illegality of the item possessed, then the circumstances 
of that possession become irrelevant.  To precondition Fourth 
Amendment protection on the contraband/noncontraband nature of 
the object of the search without consideration of the privacy interests 
compromised by the investigation itself represents a worrisome 
reorientation of the Fourth Amendment.  This shorthand Fourth 
Amendment analysis could, for all intents and purposes, consume the 
Fourth Amendment, except in situations where the Court has 
expressly provided protection from intrusive police practices.  
Accordingly, resolution of the canine home-sniff question has far-
reaching Fourth Amendment implications. 
To explore the canine home-sniff issue, Part II of this Article 
considers two competing lines of U.S. Supreme Court caselaw that 
have split the lower courts’ analysis in this area.8  Three critical issues 
 
and, thus, not a “search”), United States v. Roby, 122 F.3d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(finding that a canine sniff of a common hotel corridor was not a “search”), United States 
v. Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632, 638 (9th Cir. 1993) (disagreeing with Thomas), United 
States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 475–76 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (same), and United States v. 
Sklar, 721 F. Supp. 7, 14 (D. Mass. 1989) (finding no expectation of privacy for 
contraband hidden in the home).  Virtually every state court that has considered the home-
sniff issue under the Federal Constitution is in accord that a canine sniff is not a “search.”  
See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1030 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (finding no 
“search” based upon “the binary nature of [the canine sniff] inquiry, contraband yea or 
nay?, precludes the possibility of infringing any [legitimate] expectation of privacy” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004) (declining to decide 
the “search” issue because reasonable suspicion to conduct the canine home-sniff was 
present); Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1056–57 (holding that a canine home-sniff was not a 
“search” under the Federal Constitution, but finding a “search” under the New York 
Constitution); State v. Smith, 963 P.2d 642, 647 (Or. 1998) (questioning Thomas); 
Rodriguez v. State, 106 S.W.3d 224, 230 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding that a sniff was not a 
“search” under the Federal Constitution).  In contrast, State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 
4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1052 (2006), stands alone in finding that a sniff 
of a private residence was a “search” under the Federal Constitution.  Cf. United States v. 
Jackson, No. IP 03-79-CR-1H/F, 2004 WL 1784756, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 2, 2004) 
(applying Kyllo-based privacy analysis, but the decision is distinguishable because the 
detection dog alerted on the back door of the residence, which the court did not view as a 
“public place”). 
8 Place along with United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), a case cited for the 
proposition that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in contraband, have 
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generated from the doctrinal analysis are then considered in Part III.  
In Part III.A, this Article argues that Place’s justifications, namely 
accuracy and limited intrusiveness, do not support extending the 
canine sniff investigative technique to the home, and that such an 
unsupported extension of Place is inconsistent with the Court’s recent 
demand for logical consistency between doctrinal extensions and the 
justifications offered to support the original rule.9  Unfortunately, 
meaningful legal analysis of Place’s underlying justifications has 
been stifled by the Place Court’s use of the term “sui generis”10 in 
describing canine sniffs.  Part III.A examines the Court’s use of the 
sui generis descriptor in other Fourth Amendment cases and argues 
that lower courts are mistakenly attributing substantive heft to a term 
that is, in fact, intended to narrow the circumstances under which a 
doctrine may be used. 
Part III.B considers the heightened expectations of privacy 
associated with the home and whether the introduction of potentially 
dangerous, and clearly intimidating, drug-detection dogs into the 
protected curtilage areas of a private home is intrusive such that the 
practice should be viewed as a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.  The analysis in Part III.B builds on the discussion in 
Part I, which describes the routine cross-training of drug-detection 
dogs for criminal apprehension, or so-called “bite dog,” purposes.  
Large and aggressive dogs are typically selected for drug-detection 
training.  In analyzing the reasonableness of privacy expectations, the 
Supreme Court has instructed that societal understandings are an 
appropriate consideration.11  Therefore, this Article argues that our 
country’s long history of using dogs to intimidate racial minorities 
and the offensiveness of dogs to followers of some religions must be 
 
formed the basis for the majority’s conclusion that canine sniffs of the home are not 
“searches.”  The competing line of cases is based primarily on Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27 (2001), a case that bars the warrantless use of nonroutine sense-enhancing 
technology directed at the home. 
9 See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (2009) (refusing to extend Belton, 
explaining that in the search-incident-to-arrest context, “[t]he safety and evidentiary 
justifications underlying Chimel’s reaching-distance rule determine Belton’s scope,” and 
further finding that the justifications are not satisfied when a recent occupant of a vehicle 
had been secured after an arrest and could not access the interior of the vehicle). 
10 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“[T]he canine sniff is sui 
generis.”). 
11 See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (observing that 
“[l]egitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth 
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to 
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society”). 
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considered when examining the intrusiveness resulting from 
introduction of a police dog into the protected curtilage area of a 
private home. 
Part III.C argues that trained drug-detection dogs are “natural” 
technology and that, when used to sniff a private residence, Kyllo 
should control. The government itself labels detection dogs as 
“technology” in its project literature.  Further, canine detection 
capabilities have been strengthened and enhanced through scientific 
research, innovative training tactics, genetics-based breeding 
programs, and even cloning technology.  As such, this Article argues 
that drug-detection dogs are “natural” technology that implicate the 
same concerns as those voiced in Kyllo: (1) “advancing technology,” 
in view of the potential for technology-based enhancement of the 
canine sniff technique, and (2) the likely disclosure of noncontraband 
information.12  Therefore, this Article argues that canine sniffs of the 
home are “searches” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
and, similar to the thermal imager warrants required after Kyllo, must 
be supported by a dog sniff warrant. 
I 
TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION OF DRUG-DETECTION DOGS AND THE 
SCIENCE OF THE CANINE SNIFF 
Dress yonder Marquis [who had stolen the banner of England] in 
what peacock-robes you will—disguise his appearance—alter his 
complexion with drugs and washes—hide him amidst an hundred 
men—I will yet pawn my sceptre that the hound detects him . . . .13 
As the above quotation suggests, dogs have been used as an 
adjunct to law enforcement for hundreds of years to assist in the 
location of fugitives.14  In modern times, canines are trained for a 
variety of purposes including drug detection, apprehension,15 
 
12 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35–38. 
13 SIR WALTER SCOTT, THE TALISMAN 256 (Ernest Rhys ed., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1914) 
(1825). 
14 Bloodhounds, as well as other breeds of dogs, are used in trailing fugitives, missing 
persons, and criminals.  See Debruler v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 752, 758 (Ky. 2007). 
15 Apprehension dogs are canines that are trained to locate and immobilize a suspect 
under circumstances during which it would be difficult or dangerous for a human officer to 
locate the suspect or secure him.  Apprehension dogs that have been trained in the “bite 
and hold” technique are trained to find a hiding human and immobilize him, typically by 
biting and holding onto the suspect’s arm.  See Jarrett v. Town of Yarmouth, 331 F.3d 140, 
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explosives detection,16 cadaver detection,17 and agriculture 
detection.18  While not trained to be “all-purpose sniffers,”19 it is not 
unusual for drug-detection dogs to be cross-trained as apprehension, 
or so-called “bite dogs.”20  Therefore, larger breeds, such as German 
shepherds or Belgian malinois,21 are often selected for drug detection 
purposes.22  While explosives-detection dogs are trained and certified 
through a federal program and under a federal certification standard,23 
drug-detection dogs are generally trained and certified by private 
vendors without the benefit of regulatory standards for training and 
certification.  For example, private vendors such as the U.S. Police 
 
143 (1st Cir. 2003) (discussing training and practices of apprehension dogs in the context 
of qualified immunity). 
16 Explosives-detection dogs are trained to sniff out “explosives, radiological materials, 
chemical, nuclear or biological weapons.”  6 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2006). 
17 See generally ANDREW REBMANN ET AL., CADAVER DOG HANDBOOK: FORENSIC 
TRAINING AND TACTICS FOR THE RECOVERY OF HUMAN REMAINS (2000). 
18 See, e.g., ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
USDA’S DETECTOR DOGS: PROTECTING AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 1 (1996), available at 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps19118/usdabbb.pdf (describing the Beagle Brigade as 
“a group of nonaggressive detector dogs and their human partners” that “search travelers’ 
luggage for prohibited fruits, plants, and meat that could harbor harmful plant and animal 
pests and diseases”). 
19 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 423 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“A dog sniff 
for explosives . . . would be an entirely different matter [from the drug-detection dog at 
issue in Caballes].  Detector dogs are ordinarily trained not as all-purpose sniffers, but for 
discrete purposes.”). 
20 See, e.g., Deborah Palman, U.S. Police Canine Ass’n, K9 Options for Law 
Enforcement, http://www.uspcak9.com/training/enforcement.cfm (last visited Apr. 29, 
2010) (observing that many “find and bite” dogs “are also cross trained to be detector dogs 
which locate drugs or other contraband”). 
21 See, e.g., TRACY L. ENGLISH, OFFICE OF HISTORY, LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE, 
THE QUIET AMERICANS: A HISTORY OF MILITARY WORKING DOGS 23 (2000), available 
at http://www.lackland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-061212-027.pdf.  The U.S.  
Department of Defense Military Working Dog program prefers the Belgian malinois breed 
because it “share[s] many of the positive traits with the German Shepherd,” including easy 
adaptation and “very good prey/kill instincts.”  Id.  “While some referred to these dogs as 
‘living weapons,’ the main purpose of the animals was deterrence.”  Id. 
22 In contrast, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) 
exclusively uses Labrador retrievers as explosive-detection canines.  Sniffing Out 
Terrorism: The Use of Dogs in Homeland Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Prevention of Management, Integration, and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Homeland 
Security, 109th Cong. 18 (2005) (statement of Special Agent Terry Bohan, Chief, National 
Canine Training and Operations Support Branch).  Although “other breeds” could detect 
explosives, ATF uses only Labrador retrievers because they are a “hearty, intelligent breed 
. . . [and] possess a gentle disposition,” which allows for them to be used “in crowds and 
around children.”  Id. 
23 See 6 U.S.C. § 532(a), (b)(3) (2006) (authorizing the use of the Explosives Training 
and Research Facility to “train canines on explosive detection”). 
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Canine Association (USPCA),24 the National Narcotic Detector Dog 
Association (NNDDA),25 and the American Working Dog 
Association (AWDA)26 offer training classes for canine handlers, as 
well as certification of drug-detection dogs, based on each 
association’s own internally generated certification standards.27 
In comparing these certification programs, certain similarities and 
therefore, perhaps, “minimum” requirements for drug detection 
canines emerge.  All programs train drug-detection dogs to search for 
marijuana and cocaine; certification for additional substances, such as 
heroin, methamphetamines, and opium, as well as certified 
derivatives of these drugs, may be available.28  Significant to the 
home-sniff issue, detection dogs are trained and certified based on 
interior walk-throughs and sniffs of buildings, not perimeter sniffs.29  
This is not to say that the certification process entirely excludes 
outside areas.  Some agencies offer certification for “open areas,” but 
 
24 U.S. POLICE CANINE ASS’N, USPCA RULEBOOK 2009 (2009), 
http://www.uspcak9.com/certification/USPCARulebook2009.pdf [hereinafter USPCA 
RULEBOOK 2009]. 
25 Nat’l Narcotic Detector Dog Ass’n, http://www.nndda.org (last visited Apr. 27, 
2010). 
26 Am. Working Dog Ass’n, http://www.americanworkingdog.com (last visited Apr. 27, 
2010). 
27 See Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of the Narcotics 
Detection Dog, 85 KY. L.J. 405, 410–15 (1996) (addressing the training of these dogs by 
federal and state law enforcement agencies). 
28 See, e.g., Am. Working Dog Ass’n, Certification Standards: Narcotic Detection 
Standards, http://www.americanworkingdog.com/certification_standards.htm#Narcotic 
_Detection Standards (last visited Apr. 27, 2010) [hereinafter AWDA Certification] 
(displaying the certifications available for narcotics-detection dogs).  The NNDDA’s 
Narcotic Detection Standard includes, at a minimum, the detection of cocaine and 
marijuana, with the option of obtaining additional certification for the detection of heroin, 
methamphetamines, and opium.  See Nat’l Narcotic Detector Dog Ass’n, Narcotic 
Detection Standards, http://www.nndda.org/official-docs/doc_download/2-narcotics           
-detection-standard (last visited Apr. 27, 2010) [hereinafter NNDDA Certification]; see 
also USPCA RULEBOOK 2009, supra note 24, at 18. 
29 For building searches under the AWDA standards, the canine must search the interior 
of a building consisting of no less than two rooms and having at least one thousand square 
feet.  AWDA Certification, supra note 28.  The NNDDA tests detection dogs on their 
ability to find two stashes of each narcotic hidden in a given area, which is “of [an] indoor 
nature (building)” that is “no larger than one thousand . . . square feet.”  See NNDDA 
Certification, supra note 28.  The USPCA uses slightly different certification 
requirements.  The location of the canine testing is limited to a vehicle and indoor, interior 
rooms.  See USPCA RULEBOOK 2009, supra note 24, at 18.  For the indoor test, the canine 
must search three furnished rooms, each measuring a minimum of two hundred square 
feet.  Id. 
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this certification appears to involve investigations for drugs hidden in 
open locations, such as fields.30 
For purposes of the canine sniff of a private home, the critical 
issues raised by unregulated drug-detection dog training and 
certification standards are significant.31  No private agency 
specifically trains or certifies detection dogs to investigate for 
contraband hidden within a building unless the dog is also permitted 
to walk through the interior of the structure for detection purposes.  
Additionally, there is no reported data concerning the accuracy of 
drug-detection dogs when the dog is limited to a perimeter sniff of a 
home.  Without data, training, or certification, evaluating the accuracy 
of drug-detection dogs in the home-sniff context amounts to little 
more than guesswork. 
With respect to the science of the canine sniff, the U.S. Department 
of Justice describes detector dogs as a type of “trace detector” capable 
of detecting vapors or particulates of specific items, including drugs 
or explosives.32  Courts that permit suspicionless canine sniffs of the 
home operate on the assumption that drug-detection dogs alert solely 
 
30 See generally supra notes 24, 28-29 (discussing certification standards for various 
private vendors). 
31 For example, even fundamental issues remain unresolved within the industry, such as 
whether detection dogs should be trained and certified using street drugs or, instead, 
“pseudo-controlled substances,” which are “legal chemicals with the same smell as illegal 
narcotics.”  See United States v. Broadway, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1192 (D. Colo. 2008) 
(defining pseudoscents).  Although the use of pseudoscents may be preferable because 
they prevent the detection dog from becoming distracted by cutting agents routinely found 
in street drugs, most certifying agencies tout the fact that they train and certify detection 
dogs using only “real” drugs.  Compare Jessica Snyder Sachs, The Fake Smell of Death, 
DISCOVER, Mar. 1996, at 89, available at http://discovermagazine.com/1996/mar/ 
thefakesmellofde714 (interviewing sensory biologist Dr. Larry Myers at Auburn 
University) (“Myers tells of a narcotics officer who had trained his dog on drugs kept in 
plastic storage bags.  ‘I’ll be damned if that dog didn’t start alerting to the scent of Ziploc 
bags,’ says Myers.  A dog trained on street drugs can likewise get distracted by cutting 
agents, homing in on baking powder in the fridge and ignoring uncut cocaine in the 
pantry.”), with S. Hills Kennels, Inc., Drug Detection Dogs, 
http://www.southernhillskennels.com/drug-dogs (last visited Apr. 29, 2010) (private 
vendor advertising that it “only use[s] real drugs, not pseudo drug scents”), and Nat’l Law 
Enforcement Canine Org., Certification Standards: Narcotics, http://www.nleco.org/ 
cert_narc.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2010) (stating that no pseudodrugs are used for 
certification). 
32 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE FOR THE SELECTION OF 
DRUG DETECTORS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT APPLICATIONS: NIJ GUIDE 601-00, at 21–23 
(2000) [hereinafter SELECTION OF DRUG DETECTORS].  The report defines a “trace drug 
detection system” as “any drug detection system that detects drugs by collecting and 
identifying traces from the material [which] may be in the form of either vapor or 
particulate.”  Id. at 50. 
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to contraband, and in doing so, reveal no noncontraband information 
about the contents of the home.33  Nothing could be further from the 
truth.  Studies show that drug-detection dogs alert not to the illegal 
drug itself, but instead to a contaminant or by-product in the drug.34  
In fact, detection dogs may not be able to detect the so-called 
ultrapure forms of drugs, such as cocaine and heroin, because of the 
extremely low vapor pressure of the unadulterated drug.35  With 
cocaine, for example, it appears that detection dogs do not actually 
alert to the cocaine itself because the drug is a topical anesthetic that 
“deadens olfactory senses.”36  Instead, the detection dog likely alerts 
to methyl benzoate, a high vapor pressure by-product of cocaine that 
can occur naturally or as a result of processing.37  Significantly, 
although methyl benzoate is a cocaine by-product, the molecule is 
also commonly found in everyday consumer products likely to be 
 
33 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003), aff’d, 864 
A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004). 
34 See generally Gary S. Settles, Sniffers: Fluid-Dynamic Sampling for Olfactory Trace 
Detection in Nature and Homeland Security—The 2004 Freeman Scholar Lecture, 127 J. 
FLUIDS ENGINEERING 189 (2005) [hereinafter Sniffers].  Dogs may not be detecting drug 
molecules, “but rather one or more other chemicals that are contaminants in the [drug] and 
that have considerably high vapor pressures.” See also SELECTION OF DRUG DETECTORS, 
supra note 32, at 21. 
35 A canine may not be able to detect drugs “manufactured in ultrapure form.”  
SELECTION OF DRUG DETECTORS, supra note 32, at 21.  Some drugs, such as heroin, are 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to detect from their vapor when conducting a trace 
detection search at room temperature and normal atmospheric pressure because the vapor 
concentration at room temperature is exceptionally low: one part per trillion.  Id. at 43. 
36 United States v. Funds in the Amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Seventy 
Dollars ($30,670.00), 403 F.3d 448, 458 (7th Cir. 2005) (“In addition, the research 
indicates that dogs do not alert to byproducts other than methyl benzoate and would not 
alert to synthetic ‘pure’ cocaine unless methyl benzoate was added.”). 
37 See L. Paul Waggoner et al., Canine Olfactory Sensitivity to Cocaine Hydrochloride 
and Methyl Benzoate, 2937 SPIE 216, 216–217 (1997).  The authors explain that “[t]his 
evidence suggests that when dogs are trained to detect cocaine in the field, their 
discriminations probably depend on one or more constituents in the vapor sample in 
addition to cocaine [hydrochloride].”  Id. at 223.  The authors also describe that an “odor 
signature” is the “constituent or multiple constituents of a substance that controls the 
olfactory detection responses of a dog,” id. at 224, and note that the study’s results 
“suggest that methyl benzoate may be one of the constituents of the illicit cocaine odor 
signature for dogs.”  Id.  The authors found that “a combination of methyl benzoate plus 
other constituents (e.g. benzoic and acetic acid or ecogine . . . ) may be required to define 
the odor signature.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  In other words, canines may be alerting not to 
pure cocaine, but instead, at least in part, to methyl benzoate and other constituents found 
in the drug whether present naturally or as a result of the chemical decomposition of the 
cocaine.  Id. 
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stored in a home, such as “solvents, insecticides, [and] perfumes.”38  
In other words, drug-detection dogs likely alert to an entirely legal 
substance, methyl benzoate, which allows the human police officer to 
infer that contraband is also present.  For example, in Horton v. 
Goose Creek Independent School District, although it was not 
discussed by the court, the drug-detection dog in question appears to 
have alerted to an entirely lawful source of methyl benzoate—a bottle 
of perfume in the student’s purse.39  Because methyl benzoate is 
commonly found in the home, further scientific clarification 
concerning the reliability of canine home-sniffs is essential. 
Additionally, it is far from clear that civil forfeiture cases, 
proceedings in which the government seeks to seize currency based 
on its connection to criminal drug trafficking, should be mechanically 
applied to cases involving canine sniffs of the home.40  Central to 
 
38 See Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency, 728 N.W.2d 510, 534–35 (Minn. 2007) 
(Hanson, J., concurring).  In his concurrence, Justice Hanson noted: 
The cases that appear to adopt the methyl benzoate theory of dog sniff drug 
detection do not discuss the fact that methyl benzoate is a common chemical used 
in multiple consumer products—solvents, insecticides, perfumes, etc.  Perhaps 
the underlying studies eliminate the possibility that a dog may alert to the 
innocent presence of methyl benzoate from the use of those products, but the 
court decisions that discuss the studies do not so indicate.  The majority opinion 
here must rely solely on the broad, untested conclusions of other courts because 
we have no scientific evidence in the record before us. 
Id.  In addition, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has approved methyl benzoate for 
use in foods as a synthetic flavoring substance.  21 C.F.R. § 172.515 (2009); see also 
Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski, Curbing the Dog: Extending the Protection of 
the Fourth Amendment to Police Drug Dogs, 85 NEB. L. REV. 735, 754–57 (2007) 
(observing both that a detection dog alerts to noncontraband items, such as methyl 
benzoate in cocaine, and that a detection dog cannot distinguish between similar 
contraband and noncontraband scents, such as heroin and acetic acid used in glues, 
marijuana and products made from hemp, methyl benzoate and cocaine, and ingredients 
contained in legal pharmaceutical drugs); Richard E. Myers II, Detector Dogs and 
Probable Cause, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) (noting that detection dogs “can also 
learn to associate certain smells with the items on which it is trained, for example air 
freshener or plastic baggies, and thus alert to non-contraband items”). 
39 690 F.2d 470, 474 (5th Cir. 1982); see also supra note 38 (discussing the common 
use of methyl benzoate in consumer products, including perfume). 
40 Courts have been called on to address the argument that most currency is 
contaminated with trace amounts of cocaine residue and, therefore, a positive canine alert 
is meaningless.  To address the currency contamination argument, the Ninth Circuit 
requires a “sophisticated dog alert,” meaning that the government “must present evidence 
that the drug detection dog ‘would not alert to cocaine residue found on currency in 
general circulation [and that] the dog was trained to, and would only, alert to the odor of a 
chemical by-product of cocaine called methyl benzoate.’”  Sumareh v. Doe (In re 
$80,045.00 in U.S. Currency), 161 F. App’x 670, 671–72 (9th Cir. 2006) (alteration in 
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civil forfeiture proceedings is the fact that methyl benzoate is a 
volatile molecule that dissipates quickly, meaning that a detection dog 
will alert to currency that has only recently been contaminated with 
street drugs, not currency that contains the trace amounts of drugs 
routinely detected in American money.41  Therefore, in the civil 
forfeiture context, methyl benzoate’s high evaporation rate, or 
volatility, provides assurance that the currency contamination is fresh.  
“Freshness” of contamination cannot be presumed from a positive 
canine alert in the home-sniff context, however, since most homes 
contain entirely lawful sources of methyl benzoate.  Additionally, no 
data exist that consider the evaporation rate of methyl benzoate on 
home surfaces or whether conditions exist in the home that might 
reduce the molecule’s volatility.42 
Finally, lack of proximity to the scent source may be a further 
problem in canine home-sniffs.  Scientific studies analyzing the 
aerodynamics of canine olfaction indicate that “[c]lose nostril 
proximity to a scent source is important.”43  The canine nose is 
dependent on scent concentration, and “the detailed spatial 
distribution of a scent source can only be discerned when the nostril is 
brought into very close proximity with it.”44  This “close proximity” 
requirement45 is an inherent limitation to the canine’s nose that, 
researchers explain, is compensated for by the dog’s natural agility 
 
original) (quoting United States v. $22,474.00 in U.S. Currency, 246 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th 
Cir. 2001)). 
41 An example of “tenacious” particulate contamination can be found in twenty-dollar 
bills, which “in the United States are contaminated with enough cocaine residue to yield 
positive detections with certain types of trace detectors.”  SELECTION OF DRUG 
DETECTORS, supra note 32, at 6–7. 
42 Cf. United States v. Funds in the Amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Seventy 
Dollars ($30,670.00), 403 F.3d 448, 458 (7th Cir. 2005) (observing that “[t]he more closed 
the environment, the slower the rate of evaporation and the longer the smell [of methyl 
benzoate] remains” and that stacked bills “lose the [methyl benzoate] odor more slowly 
[than unstacked] bills”). 
43 Gary S. Settles et al., The External Aerodynamics of Canine Olfaction, in SENSORS 
AND SENSING IN BIOLOGY AND ENGINEERING 323, 323 (Friedrich G. Barth et al. eds., 
2003) [hereinafter Aerodynamics of Canine Olfaction].  The purpose of this study was to 
determine how an electronic trace detector could be designed to mimic the capabilities of a 
dog’s nose.  Id. 
44 Id. at 325. 
45 See Sniffers, supra note 34, at 199 (observing that a detection dog’s ability to “‘read’ 
detailed olfactory ‘messages’” is directly tied to proximity sniffing and, therefore, “in 
order to properly interrogate chemical traces it really is necessary for a dog to poke its 
nose into everyone’s business”). 
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and mobility.46  When a drug-detection dog engages in a close 
proximity sniff, researchers have documented a process, described as 
“scanning,” by which the detection canine discovers or hones in on a 
scent source.47  During the scanning process, the detection dog sniffs 
close to the ground until reaching the scent source.48  The dog then 
moves its nose horizontally to the scent source, pausing when directly 
on top of it.49  The dog scans past the scent source but then returns to 
the scent once the scanning process has ceased, allowing the canine to 
take a survey of the distribution of the scent.50 
If it is optimal for a drug-detection canine to be in close proximity 
to the scent source, then a canine home-sniff may be compromised by 
situational impediments (i.e., lack of proximity) in using the 
“scanning” process on which detection and tracking dogs typically 
rely.51  The proximity consideration becomes even hazier when 
considering external factors, such as weather and crosswinds,52 which 
can also interfere with the range of a canine sniff.  Additionally, the 
ease of particulate contamination on locations accessible to the public, 
 
46 See Aerodynamics of Canine Olfaction, supra note 43, at 334 (explaining that 
“evolution has . . . given the canine an agile platform with which to bring its aerodynamic 
sampler into close proximity with a scent source”). 
47 Id. at 327–28; see also Sniffers, supra note 34, at 199. 
48 See Aerodynamics of Canine Olfaction, supra note 43, at 327; see also Sniffers, supra 
note 34, at 203. 
49 See Aerodynamics of Canine Olfaction, supra note 43, at 327–28. 
50 Id.  The mucous lining in a canine’s nose serves an important purpose in canine 
olfaction.  Specifically, it can trap contraband particulates, resulting in “the natural way of 
sampling and chemosensing aerosol-borne trace substances.”  Id. at 331; see also Sniffers, 
supra note 34, at 196 (observing that a dry nose or “[e]xtreme aridity” can compromise 
quality of sniff by inhibiting olfaction). 
51 Even in situations involving more traditional uses of drug-detection dogs, such as 
luggage or vehicle sniffs, there is little data concerning the dog’s accuracy.  As discussed 
in Part III.A, almost all of our understanding of detection-dog reliability arises from 
anecdotal discussions in judicial opinions concerning the individual detection dog at issue 
in the case.  See R v. Kang-Brown, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456, 2008 SCC 18 ¶ 15 (Can.) 
(observing that “courts are ill-equipped to develop an adequate legal framework for use of 
police dogs [because] . . . little is known about investigative techniques using sniffer dogs.  
Indeed, the record remains singularly bereft of useful information about sniffer dogs.”).  
The data that does exist suggest real questions about reliability, however.  See infra note 
204 (discussing, among other things, studies of drug-detection dog field accuracy as 
reported by the Privacy Ombudsman of New South Wales to the Australian Parliament, 
which revealed that about seventy-three percent of those searched on the basis of a 
positive canine sniff were found not to be in possession of illegal drugs). 
52 See Sniffers, supra note 34, at 205 (explaining that “[i]n the animal world, the only 
remedy for [breezes interrupting the sniff process] is proximity: If your nostrils are 
touching the sampled surface, then the wind is not an issue”). 
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such as door handles,53 may render a positive sniff meaningless in the 
home-sniff context since the home’s occupants have little, and 
sometimes no, control over who accesses this open curtilage area. 
The canine sniff technique’s reliance on the detection of methyl 
benzoate raises two separate issues in the home-sniff context: (1) 
factual questions involving the detection dog’s accuracy or reliability 
because the home is a common repository for substances that contain 
the entirely legal methyl benzoate molecule, and no data exist that 
consider whether situational impediments in the home-sniff context 
may compromise an otherwise “reliable” canine’s detection 
capabilities; and (2) legal questions, since Kyllo prohibits technology-
enhanced inferencing about the interior of a home that discloses 
noncontraband information.54  Too many uncertainties and gaps in 
scientific proof presently exist to assume that a positive canine home-
sniff is an appropriate basis on which to issue a search warrant. 
II 
COMPETING LINES OF U.S. SUPREME COURT CASELAW: WHICH LINE 
CONTROLS CANINE SNIFFS OF THE HOME? 
Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on 
their own cannot be trusted.  And so the Constitution requires a 
magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they violate the 
privacy of the home.55 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”56  The touchstone of the modern 
Fourth Amendment analysis turns on whether the person has a 
 
53 As the U.S. Department of Justice has explained: 
[P]articulate contamination is easily transferred from one surface to another, so a 
person who has handled cocaine will transfer cocaine particles to anything else 
he or she touches, including skin, clothing, door handles, furniture, and personal 
belongings.  Completely removing particulate contamination from an object 
requires rigorous cleaning, and, in the case of bare hands, a single thorough 
washing may not be sufficient to remove all particles. 
SELECTION OF DRUG DETECTORS, supra note 32, at 6 (emphasis added). 
54 See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).  For a discussion of the 
police inferencing issue, see infra Part II.B. 
55 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). 
56 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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“constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”57  In 
Katz, the Court rejected the government’s argument that a “search” 
occurs only when there has been a “physical intrusion” into a 
“constitutionally protected area,” and reoriented the Fourth 
Amendment inquiry through the Court’s now-familiar observation 
that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”58 
A.  Focus on the Item: No Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in 
Possession of Unlawful Contraband 
Prior to Place, the Court signaled in Florida v. Royer the likely 
favorable treatment that canine sniffs would receive, at least where 
the sniff involved luggage located at an airport.59  The Royer Court’s 
reference to the canine sniff technique was dicta,60 however, because 
the detectives never actually subjected Royer’s bags to a drug-
detection sniff.  As a way of avoiding lengthy and intrusive 
detentions, the Royer Court seemed to invite the use of canine sniffs 
as an investigative tool, noting that the brevity of the detention 
associated with a canine sniff would likely ensure that the boundaries 
of Terry v. Ohio61 would not be exceeded.62  The Royer dicta was 
clear foreshadowing of both the favorable treatment that canine sniffs 
would receive and the Court’s eagerness to consider the canine sniff 
issue itself, not just the reasonableness of the detention that made the 
sniff possible. 
 
57 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  Katz 
overruled the “trespass” doctrine of Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), and 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).  Later Courts have described the Katz test 
as the “touchstone,” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986), and the “lodestar,” 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979), in determining whether a surveillance 
technique is a “search” within the Fourth Amendment. 
58 Katz, 389 U.S. at 350–51. 
59 460 U.S. 491, 505–06 (1983). 
60 In his concurrence, Justice Brennan pointed out that the question of using drug-
detection dogs to detect contraband in luggage “is clearly not before us.”  Id. at 511 n.* 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
61 See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (upholding the stop and subsequent 
frisk of an individual based on the officer’s observation of suspicious behavior and 
reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed). 
62 Royer, 460 U.S. at 505 (observing that “the State has not touched on the question 
whether it would have been feasible to investigate the contents of Royer’s bags in a more 
expeditious way.  The courts are not strangers to the use of trained dogs to detect the 
presence of controlled substances in luggage.”). 
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Just three months later, the Court again went out of its way to 
discuss canine sniffs in United States v. Place.63  There, detectives 
seized Place’s luggage on the basis of reasonable suspicion and 
subjected the luggage to a drug-detection dog.  The issue before the 
Court was whether Terry supported the limited detention of personal 
property on the basis of reasonable suspicion.  The Court concluded 
that Terry would permit such a limited detention, but the detectives’ 
ninety-minute detention of the luggage was too lengthy to be 
supported under Terry.64 
Although Place did not challenge the validity of the canine sniff to 
which his luggage was eventually subjected and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit did not consider the sniff issue, the 
Court went beyond the issues presented to consider the canine sniff 
question without the benefit of briefs or argument on this issue.65  
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor discussed the canine sniff 
issue in a conclusory, two-paragraph, citationless statement: 
A “canine sniff” by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, 
does not require opening the luggage.  It does not expose 
noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from 
public view, as does, for example, an officer’s rummaging through 
the contents of the luggage.  Thus, the manner in which information 
is obtained through this investigative technique is much less 
intrusive than a typical search.  Moreover, the sniff discloses only 
the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.  Thus, 
despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about 
the contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited.  
This limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the property is 
not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in 
less discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods. 
 
63 462 U.S. 696, 719 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (observing that the canine sniff 
issue had not been argued or briefed to the Court and that consideration of  the canine sniff 
was unnecessary because the Court had concluded that detention of Place’s luggage had 
exceeded permissible guidelines under Terry). 
64 Id. at 709–10 (majority opinion).  In addition, the detectives’ failure to provide Place 
with clear directions about the storage and return of his bags exacerbated the intrusiveness 
of the seizure.  Id. at 710. 
65 Id. at 719 (Brennan, J., concurring) (observing that Place “did not contest the validity 
of sniff searches per se” at trial, “[t]he Court of Appeals did not reach or discuss the [sniff] 
issue,” and that the question of canine sniffs had not been briefed or argued to the Court 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 723 (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(“Neither party has had an opportunity to brief the issue, and the Court grasps for the 
appropriate analysis of the problem.  Although it is not essential that the Court ever adopt 
the views of one of the parties, it should not decide an issue on which neither party has 
expressed any opinion at all.”). 
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 In these respects, the canine sniff is sui generis.  We are aware 
of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the 
manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of 
the information revealed by the procedure.  Therefore, we conclude 
that the particular course of investigation that the agents intended to 
pursue here—exposure of respondent’s luggage, which was located 
in a public place, to a trained canine—did not constitute a “search” 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.66 
While the Place Court’s failure to request briefs and argument 
concerning the canine sniff issue is certainly surprising, the Court’s 
refusal to consider the debate that had percolated through the lower 
courts prior to Place is perplexing.67  The Court cited not a single 
case, transforming its pronouncement that a canine sniff is “sui 
generis,” and therefore not a “search,” into an unassailable judicial 
 
66 Id. at 707 (majority opinion). 
67 As the Royer plurality observed, the various Courts of Appeals had disagreed about 
whether a canine sniff of luggage was a “search.”  Royer, 460 U.S. at 505 n.10.  The pre-
Place lower courts divided into two camps: (1) those that required reasonable suspicion to 
support a canine sniff, see United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1335 (9th Cir. 1982), 
vacated, 463 U.S. 1202 (1983) (vacating the judgment and remanding for further 
consideration in light of United States v. Place), and (2) those that concluded a canine sniff 
was not a search, therefore no suspicion was required.  See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 
625 F.2d 9, 13 (4th Cir. 1980).  The Second Circuit even coined the amusing phrase 
“canine cannabis connoisseur” to describe drug-detection dogs.  United States v. 
Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 460 (2d Cir. 1975).  The military was also dealing with canine 
sniff issues involving even clearer privacy concerns, such as the canine sniff of barracks, 
lockers, and on-base residences.  The Military Rule of Evidence 313(b) required 
reasonable suspicion to conduct unscheduled “shakedown” inspections, which could 
include “any reasonable or natural technological aid,” such as a canine sniff, of individual 
living areas and lockers.  See MIL. R. EVID. 313(b) (“Inspections may utilize any 
reasonable natural or technological aid and may be conducted with or without notice to 
those inspected.”); see also James P. Pottorff, Jr., Canine Narcotics Detection in the 
Military: A Continuing Bone of Contention?, ARMY LAW., July 1984, at 73, 77.  Two pre-
Place decisions issued by the U.S. Air Force Court of Military Review reflect the tension 
between the military tribunal decisions on this issue.  In United States v. Peters, a canine 
sniff of the defendant’s car was performed by a drug-detection dog as a part of a random 
gate inspection.  11 M.J. 901, 902 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1981).  After a suspected bag of 
marijuana and unknown pills were found, the handler and canine went to the accused’s on-
base residence, where the dog alerted at a front window.  Id.  At the time of the alert, the 
dog’s “hind feet were on the ground in the yard and [its] front paws were on the window 
sill.”  Id.  The court determined that the canine sniff was a search, despite the fact that the 
window was slightly open.  Id. at 904.  In contrast, in United States v. Guillen, the court 
determined that a canine sniff conducted at the only door of the accused’s residence was 
not a search.  14 M.J. 518, 519, 521 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1982).  In view of the split on 
the canine sniff issue and the clear indications that drug-detection sniffs could be used in 
ways that implicate more serious privacy concerns, the Place Court’s failure to cite even a 
single case and, instead, issue a global pronouncement on this important legal question is 
therefore perplexing. 
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monolith.68  After Place, it appeared that if the original seizure of the 
individual or the individual’s personal property was supported by 
reasonable suspicion, then the ensuing canine sniff was permissible 
because the sniff, by definition, was not a search. 
Soon after Place, the Court considered another case that would 
have important implications in the canine sniff area.  In United States 
v. Jacobsen, the Court considered whether warrantless field testing of 
a white powder to determine whether it was cocaine violated the 
Fourth Amendment when that powder was discovered by Federal 
Express employees and then turned over to the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA).69  Significant to the canine sniff 
question, the field test was able to identify the powder as cocaine but 
was unable to determine whether the powder was any other 
substance.70 
The Court granted certiorari to consider two separate issues: (1) the 
scope of the private search doctrine,71 and (2) the warrantless field 
testing of suspected contraband.  In an opinion authored by Justice 
Stevens, the Court agreed that field testing of the white powder was 
not a search under the Fourth Amendment because it compromised no 
legitimate interest in privacy.72  The Court explained that government 
conduct that established only whether a substance was cocaine and 
revealed “no other arguably ‘private’ fact” compromised no 
legitimate privacy interest.73  The Court’s conclusion was “dictated” 
by Place because field testing, like a canine sniff, revealed nothing 
about noncontraband items.74 
 
68 See Katz & Golembiewski, supra note 38, at 741 (arguing that in Place “[t]here was 
no authority offered for the broad conclusions which have controlled the law for the past 
twenty-three years; moreover, the unsolicited decision of the issue has served to preclude 
it from ever being considered fully”). 
69 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984). 
70 Id. at 122. 
71 The Court explained that, under circumstances where the authorities simply 
“reexamine” the materials discovered by a private actor, id. at 119, the government has not 
intruded on any expectation of privacy that “has not already been frustrated.”  Id. at 117. 
72 Id. at 123 (explaining that Congress had criminalized the “private” possession of 
cocaine, making its possession illegitimate). 
73 Id.  The Court expressly limited its discussion to contraband.  Id. at 123 n.23. 
74 Id. at 123–24.  As Justice Stevens explained, “[t]he field test at issue could disclose 
only one fact previously unknown to the agent–whether or not a suspicious white powder 
was cocaine.  It could tell him nothing more, not even whether the substance was sugar or 
talcum powder.”  Id. at 122. 
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In an observation that may have important modern implications, 
the Jacobsen Court also noted that “[h]ere, as in Place, the likelihood 
that official conduct of the kind disclosed by the record will actually 
compromise any legitimate interest in privacy seems much too remote 
to characterize the testing as a search subject to the Fourth 
Amendment.”75  This “remoteness” consideration from Jacobsen is 
potentially significant in analyzing canine sniffs in general, and the 
home sniff, in particular.  This issue is considered in Part III.A, which 
discusses our modern understanding of error rates associated with 
canine sniffs and whether, in view of these acknowledged error rates, 
the risk of uncovering private, noncontraband information during the 
ensuing search can truly be characterized as “remote.” 
Although Place’s conclusions regarding the unique diagnostic 
capabilities of canine sniffs have been criticized as inaccurate,76 the 
Court recently ensured the ongoing legal vitality of the canine sniff 
technique in Illinois v. Caballes.77  Caballes involved a routine traffic 
stop for speeding.78  Although there was no suspicion that Caballes 
was transporting drugs, a drug interdiction team member, who had 
arrived at the traffic stop while the ticket was being written, walked a 
drug-detection dog around Caballes’s vehicle.  The dog alerted on the 
trunk, which the officers opened and discovered the marijuana for 
which Caballes was arrested.79 
Important to the Caballes Court in upholding the validity of the 
canine sniff was both the legality of the initial traffic stop80 and the 
fact that the canine sniff process had not extended the length of 
 
75 Id. at 124 (emphasis added). 
76 See George M. Dery III, Who Let the Dogs Out? The Supreme Court Did in Illinois v. 
Caballes by Placing Absolute Faith in Canine Sniffs, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 377, 403–06 
(2006) (addressing the various factors affecting the accuracy of drug-detector dogs); see 
also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing that 
“[t]he infallible dog, however, is a creature of legal fiction”).  Justice Souter cataloged 
lower court cases in which surprisingly high error rates failed to result in a finding of 
unreliability.  S ee id. at 412. 
77 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).  The Caballes majority opinion was authored by Justice 
Stevens, who also wrote the majority opinion in United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 
(1984).  Caballes was a six-to-two decision in which Chief Justice Rehnquist did not 
participate. 
78 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 407 (observing that “[h]ere, the initial seizure of respondent when he was 
stopped on the highway was based on probable cause and was concededly lawful”). 
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Caballes’s detention beyond the time necessary to write the ticket.81  
In upholding the legality of the canine sniff, the Court relied on 
Jacobsen’s premise that a person lacks a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in contraband.82  Through some arguably loose language, the 
Court may have expanded the Jacobsen premise in a manner that 
could have a real impact on the home-sniff issue.  The Caballes Court 
first quoted Jacobsen for the proposition that “[o]fficial conduct that 
does not ‘compromise any legitimate interest in privacy’ is not a 
search subject to the Fourth Amendment.”83  The Caballes Court 
then, in an apparent expansion of Jacobsen, stated that “any interest 
in possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‘legitimate.’”84 
Returning for a moment to the Jacobsen opinion, the focus there 
was on the distinction between contraband and noncontraband 
information.85  As the Jacobsen Court explained, “[a] chemical test 
that merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine 
does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy.”86  The 
circumstances that made the field testing possible (the private search 
issue) were treated separately by the Jacobsen Court.87  Therefore, 
the focus in this portion of the Jacobsen opinion was on the accuracy 
of the information to be gained by the field testing, not the 
circumstances under which this investigative tool might be used.88  
The Caballes Court, on the other hand, focused on more than just the 
contraband/noncontraband nature of the information revealed.  By 
observing that “any interest in possessing contraband [is not] 
 
81 Id. at 407 (“A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket 
to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to 
complete that mission.”). 
82 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122 (observing that “[t]he concept of an interest in privacy 
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is, by its very nature, critically different 
from the mere expectation, however well justified, that certain facts will not come to the 
attention of the authorities”). 
83 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123). 
84 Id. (emphasis added). 
85 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122. 
86 Id. at 123. 
87 Id. at 118 (finding that the DEA agents’ invasions of privacy involved “two steps”: 
(1) the removal of ziplock bags from a damaged package and a duct-taped tube within the 
package, both having been previously opened by Federal Express employees, and the 
removal of “a trace of powder” from one of the ziplock bags, and (2) the chemical field 
test of the powder). 
88 See id. at 123 (observing that “even if the results are negative–merely disclosing that 
the substance is something other than cocaine—such a result reveals nothing of special 
interest”). 
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legitimate,” the Caballes Court may be suggesting that the 
circumstances of contraband possession are irrelevant.89  Further 
support for this reorientation can be found in the Caballes majority’s 
explanation that the opinion was “entirely consistent” with Kyllo v. 
United States in that “[c]ritical to [the Kyllo] decision was the fact 
that the [thermal-imaging] device was capable of detecting lawful 
activity—in that case, intimate details in a home, such as ‘at what 
hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and 
bath.’”90  The key question after Caballes is whether the majority’s 
reference to Kyllo was simply illustrative of the special legal 
significance attributed to an investigative technique that reveals only 
contraband, but no noncontraband information, or instead, if Caballes 
is intended to signal the Court’s willingness to exclude any 
consideration of the circumstances of the contraband’s discovery.  
This would mean that a person lacks any expectation of privacy in 
contraband, even contraband that is secreted in the person’s private 
residence. 
As a final point, the Caballes Court again used the sui generis 
terminology to describe the canine sniff and cited to both Place and 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, a case involving the canine sniff of a 
vehicle’s exterior at a drug interdiction checkpoint.91  In Edmond, 
although the checkpoint seizure itself was found to violate the Fourth 
Amendment,92 the Court refused to view the canine sniff of the 
vehicle as a “search.”93  While the canine sniff was not “transformed” 
into a search simply because the seizure of Edmond’s vehicle at the 
checkpoint was unreasonable, the Edmond Court did not suggest that 
the search and the seizure issues should be analytically severed from 
one another.94  In fact, the Edmond Court’s holding is to the contrary.  
Because the narcotics interdiction checkpoint did not meet the Court’s 
requirements for suspicionless, administrative-type seizures, police 
were required to establish individualized suspicion to stop a vehicle 
 
89 See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
90 Id. at 409–10 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001)). 
91 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000). 
92 Id. at 47 (observing that “[w]hen law enforcement authorities pursue primarily 
general crime control purposes at checkpoints such as here, . . . stops can only be justified 
by some quantum of individualized suspicion”). 
93 Id. at 40 (“The fact that officers walk a narcotics-detection dog around the exterior of 
each car at the Indianapolis checkpoints does not transform the seizure into a search. . . . 
Just as in Place, an exterior sniff of an automobile does not require entry into the car and is 
not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of narcotics.”). 
94 Id. 
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for investigation.95  The effect, therefore, is that no canine sniff of a 
moving vehicle would be permissible without first showing the 
appropriate quantum of suspicion to stop the vehicle. 
Left unanswered after Caballes and Edmond is whether, at least in 
the vehicle context, the seizure and the search issues could be 
analytically severed.  The practical effect of disconnecting the seizure 
from the search would be to make it possible for police to run drug-
detection dogs through public parking lots to conduct suspicionless 
sniffs of parked vehicles.96  Since no seizure would be necessary to 
investigate a parked vehicle and a canine sniff of a vehicle is not a 
“search,” suspicionless, dragnet searches would therefore become 
possible.97  Further, if the Court permits the disconnection of the 
seizure and search issues in the vehicle context, it sets the stage for 
arguing that a home sniff would also be permissible.  Since it could be 
argued that no seizure occurs when a detection dog performs a sniff 
from the front-door curtilage area of a private home, the Place 
opinion would make most canine sniffs of the home judicially 
unreachable. 
Several points bear emphasis when examining the Place, Jacobsen, 
and Caballes decisions and their potential applicability to canine 
sniffs conducted outside of a home.  These cases were implicitly, and 
in some cases explicitly, based on three essential, and interrelated, 
legal and factual observations that will be discussed below: (1) the 
lawfulness of the antecedent seizure that made the canine sniff 
possible, (2) the sniffs occurred under circumstances involving lesser 
expectations of privacy, and (3) the sniffed item had been 
disconnected from the person of the suspect at the time of the sniff. 
1.  Lawful Antecedent Seizure 
First, in each of the above-referenced cases, the legality of the 
police investigative tactic (i.e., canine sniff and field testing) 
implicitly turned on the lawfulness of the initial seizure of the item or 
 
95 See id. at 47. 
96 Cf. Nina Paul & Will Trachman, Fidos and Fi-dont’s: Why the Supreme Court 
Should Have Found a Search in Illinois v. Caballes, 9 BOALT J. CRIM. L. 1, 20 (2005) 
(observing that “[g]iven the perhaps overzealous use of dog sniffs currently, the 
government could easily fall down the slippery slope of using dog sniffs regularly and 
anywhere”). 
97 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 422 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (warning 
that “[t]oday’s decision . . . clears the way for suspicionless, dog-accompanied drug 
sweeps of parked cars along sidewalks and in parking lots”). 
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person.98  While the Court implicitly tied its approval of the police 
investigative tool at issue to the lawfulness of the seizure, the Court 
failed to expressly precondition the tool’s use on the lawfulness of the 
first step, the “seizure.”  By making the antecedent justification 
requirement only an implicit precondition in these decisions, the 
Court has made it possible for lower courts to disconnect the seizure 
from the sniff altogether.99  The resulting softening and attenuation 
between these interrelated legal issues100 has important implications 
for the home-sniff question.  As a factual matter, no control over the 
residence, in other words, no “seizure,” need be taken in order to 
conduct the sniff.  By oversimplifying Place and Jacobsen and 
focusing exclusively on the police investigative technique, courts 
have sidestepped the antecedent justification requirement essential to 
a lawful seizure, in other words, the context in which the investigative 
tactic is used.  In his Jacobsen dissent, Justice Brennan warned of the 
danger that results from this sort of oversimplification.101  He 
cautioned that exempting any “class of surveillance technique” as 
categorically outside the definition of “search” or “seizure” without 
consideration of the “context” in which the tactic was used could lead 
 
98 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (finding that a canine sniff during an otherwise lawful 
traffic stop was permissible even without any suspicion that driver was transporting drugs 
in vehicle); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120–21 (1984) (“While the agents’ 
assertion of dominion and control over the package and its contents did constitute a 
‘seizure,’ . . . that seizure was not unreasonable” (footnote omitted)); United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 710 (1983) (“In short, we hold that the detention of respondent’s 
luggage in this case went beyond the narrow authority possessed by police to detain briefly 
luggage reasonably suspected to contain narcotics.”). 
99 See, e.g., People v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 224, 229 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (“The high 
court’s fleeting reference to a ‘public place’ in Place simply indicated, at most, that the 
luggage containing contraband was in an area in which the police and the canine were 
lawfully present.” (emphasis added)). 
100 Cf. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951).  In Jeffers, the government 
argued that search and seizure were severable legal issues in a drug prosecution.  Id.  The 
Court disagreed, explaining that “[w]e do not believe the events are so easily isolable.  
Rather they are bound together by one sole purpose—to locate and seize the narcotics of 
respondent.  The search and seizure are, therefore, incapable of being untied.”  Id. 
101 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  As Justice Brennan cautioned: 
 What is most startling about the Court’s interpretation of the term “search,” 
both in this case and in Place, is its exclusive focus on the nature of the 
information or item sought and revealed through the use of a surveillance 
technique, rather than on the context in which the information or item is 
concealed. . . . [T]he Court adopts a general rule that a surveillance technique 
does not constitute a search if it reveals only whether or not an individual 
possesses contraband. 
Id. 
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to dragnet-style, or even selective, applications of the surveillance 
tactic.102 
2.  Reduced Expectation of Privacy 
Second, police investigation of the suspicious items in the above-
referenced cases took place at locations, or under circumstances, 
where the suspects had lesser expectations of privacy.103  Lower 
courts have seized on what they view as the “public location” of 
canine home-sniffs as a primary justification for allowing them.104  
As these courts have explained, the canine sniff of a home is also 
conducted from a public location, such as a common hallway in front 
of an apartment or the front porch area of a freestanding residence.  
Therefore, they argue, the public location from which the sniff is 
conducted makes it essentially identical to the canine sniff performed 
in Place.  This deceptively plausible argument misses the point.  In 
both Place and Caballes, the canine sniff was performed under 
circumstances in which the suspect had a lesser expectation of 
privacy; these cases did not turn on the lawfulness of the location of 
the officer’s feet (or the dog’s paws).  While public location may be 
important in evaluating expectations of privacy, location alone cannot 
be understood as the sole circumstance-driven requirement from these 
Supreme Court decisions.  When the analysis is refocused onto the 
reduced expectation of privacy involved in the circumstances under 
which the investigative tactic was used, these decisions stand in sharp 
contrast to the heightened privacy interests associated with the 
home.105 
 
102 See id. 
103 See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (concluding that “the particular course of investigation 
that the agents intended to pursue here—exposure of respondent’s luggage, which was 
located in a public place, to a trained canine—did not constitute a ‘search’” (emphasis 
added)); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493–94 (1983) (applying this standard to 
an airport). 
104 See, e.g., Stabler v. State, 990 So. 2d 1258, 1259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) 
(allowing a canine sniff at the front door of the defendant’s apartment because the front 
door was “open to public access and to a common area”); Jones, 755 N.W.2d at 229 
(explaining that where the canine sniff was conducted at the front door of the defendant’s 
private home, there is “no reasonable expectation of privacy at the entrance to property 
that is open to the public, including the front porch”). 
105 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (observing that the search of the 
interior of a home represents “the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of 
protected privacy”). 
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3.  Disconnection from the Suspect 
Third, as a further observation, in each of the above-referenced 
cases the suspicious item was not on the person of the suspect at the 
time the police investigative technique was used.106  Disconnection 
therefore reinforces the first and second organizing principles.  In 
other words, disconnection from the owner could be reflective of the 
fact that the initial police access to the item that made the surveillance 
tactic possible (the “seizure”) was supported by an appropriate 
quantum of suspicion.  Additionally, when the item is disconnected 
from the person of the suspect, as was the case in both Place and 
Caballes, further investigation, in the form of a canine sniff, may be 
less invasive and offensive and therefore less intrusive.107  The 
disconnection becomes part of the circumstances of the sniff, a fact 
that suggests that the canine sniff was not so intrusive that it violated 
the suspect’s Fourth Amendment interests.108  With a canine home-
sniff, no disconnection of the person from the person’s home is 
necessary.  Therefore, potentially intimidating or offensive encounters 
between a home’s occupants and an investigating canine team is 
increasingly likely.109 
B.  Focus on Privacy: Sense-Enhancing Technology Directed at the 
Home 
While the extent to which drug-detection dogs will or should be 
viewed as “technology” remains unresolved, a canine sniff certainly 
 
106 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406 (2005) (considering a drug-detection sniff 
conducted while Caballes was seated in a police vehicle); Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120 n.18 
(stating that “respondents had entrusted possession of the items to Federal Express”); 
Place, 462 U.S. at 696 (explaining that after Place identified luggage as his, DEA agents 
took the luggage from LaGuardia Airport to Kennedy Airport in order to subject the bags 
to a “‘sniff test’ by a trained narcotics detection dog”). 
107 Cf. Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 94 (7th Cir. 1980) (Swygert, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that a canine sniff of a person is more intrusive than a sniff of “inanimate and 
unattended objects”). 
108 See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 477 (5th Cir. 
1982) (contrasting the sniff of a schoolchild’s person with a luggage sniff at an airport and 
observing that “[o]ther circuits have emphasized the minimal humiliation entailed in dogs 
sniffing unattended luggage”). 
109 See, e.g., Langley v. State, 735 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (detailing 
that a suspect encountered six officers and a police dog while sitting on the steps of her 
mobile home, and “she was afraid of the dog”). 
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represents sense enhancement of the human sense of smell.110  
Accordingly, courts faced with a warrantless sniff of a residence must 
either rely on Kyllo v. United States111 or reject the decision’s 
applicability.112  Therefore, careful analysis of Kyllo is essential. 
In Kyllo, the defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained 
pursuant to a search warrant issued in reliance on the results of a 
thermal-imaging scan113 of his home.  The scan, conducted from the 
lawful vantage point of a public street, revealed temperature gradients 
that were consistent with high-intensity lights used in an indoor 
marijuana growing operation.114  In finding that the warrantless use of 
the thermal imager violated Kyllo’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy, the Court’s central legal premise was that “the Fourth 
Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house’” that 
“must be not only firm but also bright.”115  Justice Scalia, writing for 
the majority, acknowledged that expectations of privacy had been 
impacted by technological advances,116 and framed the issue as “what 
limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of 
 
110 In Place, Justice Brennan pointed out that “[a] dog adds a new and previously 
unobtainable dimension to human perception” and therefore represents an additional 
intrusion into privacy.  Place, 462 U.S. at 719–20 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
111 533 U.S. 27 (2001).  In fact, the only post-Kyllo case that concludes that a canine 
home-sniff is a “search” under the Federal Constitution is State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175 
(Fla.  4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1052 (2006).  United States v. Thomas is a 
pre-Kyllo case, but its reasoning is consistent with Kyllo’s concerns about gaining 
information about the interior of a home.  United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 
(2d Cir. 1985) (observing that “[w]ith a trained dog police may obtain information about 
what is inside a dwelling that they could not derive from the use of their own senses”). 
112 See supra note 7 (listing courts that find a canine sniff of a private residence is not a 
“search” under the Federal Constitution); see also Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1190 (describing 
the reliance on the Place/Jacobsen binary search approach as representing a “fundamental 
philosophical divide” from the privacy-based analysis of the Rabb majority). 
113 A thermal imager is a handheld device, similar to a video camera, that detects 
infrared radiation.  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.  The device detects only heat emanating from the 
exterior of the home, however, and is not able to penetrate walls or windows.  Id. at 41 n.1 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
114 Id. at 30 (majority opinion).  “The scan showed that the roof over [Kyllo’s] garage 
and a side wall of [his] home were relatively hot compared to the rest of [his] home and 
substantially warmer than [his neighbors’ residences].”  Id. 
115 Id. at 40. 
116 Id. at 33–34 (observing that “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of 
privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the 
advance of technology”).  The majority pointed to the aerial surveillance cases as 
examples of technology (human flight) that had enabled police to view uncovered areas of 
the home or curtilage that had historically gone unobserved.  Id. at 34. 
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guaranteed privacy.”117  The Court concluded that “obtaining by 
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of 
the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without 
physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ . . . 
constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in 
question is not in general public use.”118  While the technology at 
issue in Kyllo was “relatively crude,” the majority underscored the 
danger that “advancing technology” would pose to privacy 
interests.119 
Kyllo sparked a vigorous dissent, authored by Justice Stevens and 
joined in by three other Justices.  The dissent viewed the thermal-
imaging device as purely passive technology that did no more than 
measure radiant heat emanating from Kyllo’s home—not a more 
sophisticated device that could peer through walls.  The dissenting 
Justices argued that there was a meaningful constitutional distinction 
between technology that gave the listener “direct access” to 
information about the interior of the home and technology that 
permitted police officers to draw “inferences” based upon 
“information in the public domain.”120  In response, the majority 
explained that while inferencing alone was not a search, the thermal-
imaging device provided information that allowed police to infer that 
contraband was present.121  In other words, the thermal scan was a 
“search” because it made technology-assisted inferencing about the 
interior of a home possible. 
Two interpretations concerning the scope of Kyllo’s prohibition on 
technology-assisted inferencing are generated: (1) the decision applies 
to all nonroutine technology-assisted surveillance of the home 
 
117 Id. 
118 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 
(1961)). 
119 Id. at 35–36 (observing that “[r]eversing [Katz’s] approach would leave the 
homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology–including imaging technology that 
could discern all human activity in the home”). 
120 Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]here is, in my judgment, a 
distinction of constitutional magnitude between ‘through-the-wall surveillance’ that gives 
the observer or listener direct access to information in a private area, on the one hand, and 
the thought processes used to draw inferences from information in the public domain, on 
the other hand”).  Justice Stevens also described the inferences as “indirect deductions,” 
id., and the “mental process of analyzing data obtained from external sources.”  Id. at 49. 
121 Id. at 37 n.4 (majority opinion) (“We say such measurement is a search; the dissent 
says it is not, because an inference is not a search.  We took that to mean that, since the 
technologically enhanced emanations had to be the basis of inferences before anything 
inside the house could be known, the use of the emanations could not be a search.”). 
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because “any information” regarding the interior of the home is 
protected,122 or (2) the decision limits only technology-assisted 
inferencing that might reveal both contraband and noncontraband 
information about the home’s interior.123  In his Kyllo dissent, Justice 
Stevens expressed concern that the Court had intended the first 
interpretation rather than the second.  He argued that the majority’s 
proposed rule would bar mechanical devices that could detect only the 
presence of an illegal substance or activity, but would reveal no 
noncontraband information,124 a clear reference to the Court’s 
favorable treatment of detection dogs in Place. 
Justice Stevens’s Kyllo dissent certainly foretells the inevitable 
intersection of the canine home-sniff question and the scope of 
Kyllo’s limitations on sense-enhancing technology directed at the 
home.  Interestingly enough, it may be Justice Stevens’s Kyllo 
interpretation that the Court ultimately embraces.  In 2005, Justice 
Stevens authored the Caballes opinion, which permitted the 
suspicionless canine sniff of a lawfully stopped vehicle.125  In dicta, 
Justice Stevens explained that the suspicionless use of a canine sniff 
to investigate the exterior of Caballes’s vehicle was entirely 
consistent with Kyllo because the sniff revealed no lawful activities or 
information.126  By pressing Kyllo’s second explanation concerning 
the contraband/noncontraband nature of the information discovered, 
the Court appears ready to reorient Kyllo to bar only warrantless use 
of sense-enhancing technology that might also reveal noncontraband 
information. 
 
122 Id. at 34 (observing that “[w]e think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology 
any information regarding the interior of the home . . . constitutes a search” (citation 
omitted)).  For discussion of so-called “routine” technology, see infra notes 325–42 and 
accompanying text. 
123 Id. at 38 (observing that the thermal-imaging scan “might disclose, for example, at 
what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath–a detail that 
many would consider ‘intimate’”). 
124 Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s rule was “far too 
broad” because it would embrace “mechanical substitutes” for detection dogs, a view that 
would be inconsistent with Place’s conclusion that, because a canine sniff discloses only 
the presence of narcotics, it is not a “search”).  The dissent pointed out the seeming 
inconsistency between Kyllo and Place’s holding and argued that this inconsistency must 
mean that “sense-enhancing equipment that identifies nothing but illegal activity is not a 
search either.”  Id. at 47–48. 
125 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). 
126 See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410 (“The legitimate expectation that information about 
perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from 
respondent’s hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk 
of his car.”); see also supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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Additionally, the Court has considered the warrantless use of other 
sense-enhancing technology directed at the home prior to Kyllo, cases 
that should prove helpful in analyzing canine home-sniffs.  One case 
in particular, United States v. Karo,127 which was cited favorably in 
Kyllo, provides insight into the home-sniff issue.  Karo involved the 
use of beeper technology128 to track the movement of cans filled with 
chemicals used in the manufacture or refinement of illegal street 
drugs after the cans had been hidden inside a private home.129  The 
Karo Court concluded that warrantless monitoring of the beeper 
violated the Fourth Amendment because the beeper provided 
“information” about the interior of the home that could not have been 
obtained through observation from outside the home’s curtilage.130  
The Court analogized the warrantless monitoring to surreptitious 
physical entry by DEA agents to search the home to determine 
whether the can of ether was still present, a clearly impermissible 
surveillance technique.131 
Karo is potentially significant because it is a post-Jacobsen case, 
yet the decision uses expansive language to describe the protection 
from police discovery afforded to property hidden in a private 
residence, language that is arguably inconsistent with the Jacobsen 
premise.  Karo states that the Fourth Amendment protects a person 
from police discovery of “information” about the interior of the 
home,132 “a critical fact” about the interior of the premises,133 
whether a “particular article” is located within the home,134 and 
concerns about monitoring “property” that has been withdrawn from 
 
127 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
128 “A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic 
signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver.”  United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 
277 (1983). 
129 Karo, 468 U.S. at 708–10. 
130 Karo, 468 U.S. at 715.  Although the government obtained a warrant authorizing the 
installment and monitoring of the beeper, the warrant was later invalidated, and the 
government did not appeal that ruling.  Id. at 710.  Therefore, the Court was asked to 
consider whether a warrant was required either to install or monitor the beeper.  Id. at 711.  
On the installation issue, Justice White, speaking for five other Justices, including Chief 
Justice Burger, concluded that no warrant was required because the installation created no 
more than the “potential for an invasion of privacy.”  Id. at 712.  The presence of the 
beeper created “at most” a “technical trespass,” the existence of which would not be 
determinative on the Fourth Amendment question.  Id. 
131 Id. at 715. 
132 Id. at 710. 
133 Id. at 715. 
134 Id. at 716. 
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public view into a home.135  While some of these references were 
simply descriptive of Karo’s facts concerning monitoring of the home 
to determine whether the can of ether was still present,136 other 
language in Karo appears to have broad applicability and may be 
relevant to the canine home-sniff analysis.  In particular, the Karo 
Court noted: 
We cannot accept the Government’s contention that it should be 
completely free from the constraints of the Fourth Amendment to 
determine by means of an electronic device, without a warrant and 
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, whether a 
particular article—or a person, for that matter—is in an 
individual’s home at a particular time.  Indiscriminate monitoring 
of property that has been withdrawn from public view would 
present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to 
escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight.137 
This language is expansive enough to bar monitoring for any type 
of item, including contraband.  The question then is whether this is a 
supportable interpretation of Karo’s reasoning.  Perhaps it is.  
Certainly, there is nothing in Karo’s expansive discussion to suggest 
that contraband hidden in the home should be excluded from the 
Court’s treatment of property “withdrawn from public view,” and 
when the Court has intended to limit its holding to certain types of 
property, it has certainly made its intentions known.138 
As an additional point, the Karo Court referenced the use of 
technology to locate whether a particular person is in a home at a 
particular time.139  While knowing a person’s location is obviously 
helpful in an ongoing criminal investigation, the location of a person 
who has an outstanding arrest warrant is of critical importance to the 
police.  In a sense, the fugitive is like contraband: (1) with an arrest 
warrant, police can enter the suspect’s home to arrest (“seize”) 
him,140 and (2) with a search warrant, police are authorized to enter a 
 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 710. 
137 Id. at 716 (emphasis added). 
138 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 n.23 (1984) (expressly limiting the 
Court’s discussion to “possession of contraband”). 
139 See Karo, 468 U.S. at 716 (arguing against the use of police technology to 
determine, among other things, whether a particular person “is in an individual’s home at a 
particular time”). 
140 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980) (holding that “an arrest warrant 
founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a 
dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within”). 
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third person’s home in order to make the arrest.141  Karo suggests that 
technology-based monitoring of a home to determine the location of a 
person, apparently even someone who could be lawfully seized upon 
discovery, would be impermissible.  If police are barred from using 
technology directed at a home to locate such a person, then 
“information” about the home should also be interpreted to include 
contraband. 
Interestingly enough, technology that would enable police to 
determine an individual’s exact location already exists.142  A 
locational scanning device that would allow police to detect an 
individual’s presence143 by identification of a computer chip 
embedded into the individual’s driver’s license is in the development 
stage.144  While it could be argued that this proposed technology 
would detect only the driver’s license rather than the actual fugitive 
individual, this is an artificial distinction because, similar to a cell 
phone, people ordinarily keep their driver’s license on their person or 
close at hand.145  An analogous inference arises when a drug-
 
141 See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 205 (1981).  The search warrant 
required in Steagald was necessary to protect the privacy interests of a third person whose 
home was entered by police in order to arrest a fugitive, not the privacy interests of the 
fugitive.  Id. at 222. 
142 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology uses radio frequencies to identify 
people or objects by reading a microchip in a wireless device from a distance, without 
making any physical contact or requiring a line of sight.  DATA PRIVACY & INTEGRITY 
ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NO. 2006-02, THE USE OF RFID FOR 
HUMAN IDENTITY VERIFICATION 2, 5 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ 
assets/privacy/privacy_advcom_12-2006_rpt_RFID.pdf; see also U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., Radio Frequency Identification (RFID): What Is It?, http://www.dhs.gov/files/ 
crossingborders/gc_1197652575426.shtm (last visited May 19, 2010).  When in the 
presence of an appropriate radio frequency, a microchip embedded in an object responds 
to the signal by sending information to a device capable of interpreting the microchip’s 
signal.  DATA PRIVACY & INTEGRITY ADVISORY COMM., supra, at 2.  Differing RFID 
chips can be read from different distances: “[s]ome can only operate over a very short 
distance of a few centimeters or less, while others may operate at longer distances of 
several meters or more.”  Id. 
143 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE USE OF 
RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION (RFID) TECHNOLOGY FOR BORDER CROSSINGS 8 
(2008) available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_cbp_rfid.pdf 
(identifying “tracking” as “a form of secondary use that exploits the uniqueness of the 
RFID number to associate a specific individual with specific places over time”). 
144 The “Enhanced Driver’s License (EDL)” is embedded with an RFID chip and 
capable of submitting information, including personal information documents.  Id. at 2.  
Some states have already passed legislation addressing EDLs.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 28.301–.308 (LexisNexis 2010). 
145 See In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing (1) Use of Pen Register and 
Trap and a Trace Device with Prospective Cell-Site Information, No. MISC. 09-104, 2009 
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detection dog alerts to a methyl benzoate source inside a private 
home.  Like the inference that a fugitive is physically present when 
the fugitive’s driver’s license or cell phone is detected inside a private 
home, detection of methyl benzoate by a drug-detection dog enables 
police to infer that contraband is also present. 
III 
FRAMING THE CANINE HOME-SNIFF DEBATE 
A.  Should Place’s Accuracy and Limited Intrusiveness Justifications 
Be Extended to Support Canine Sniffs of the Home? 
This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of 
constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when 
one story too many is added.146 
While permitting canine sniffs of the home is simply a newer 
application of the rule set out in United States v. Place,147 extending 
Place to this newer, residential factual setting requires courts to 
engage in an analogous sort of “construction” process to the one 
warned about above by Justice Jackson in his Douglas v. City of 
Jeannette concurrence.  Courts, at times, extend a constitutional rule 
too far to be supported by the rule’s doctrinal underpinnings, and 
when that happens, sometimes that floor, too, crashes in.  The Court 
has shown a recent willingness to examine critically a constitutional 
rule that has been extended in a way that was incompatible with the 
rule’s justifications.148  As discussed below, like the rule extension 
recently rejected in Arizona v. Gant, Place’s accuracy and limited-
intrusiveness justifications do not support extending Place to include 
canine sniffs of the home.149 
 
WL 1530195, at *4  (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2009) (finding that in the trap and trace context, 
cell phone locational technology—commonly known as “pinging” of a suspect’s cell 
phone—was more precise than a global positioning system device and, therefore, required 
a showing of probable cause to obtain a court order because the suspect’s movements 
inside the home could be tracked). 
146 Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
147 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
148 See infra note 344 and accompanying text. 
149 See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (2009); cf. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 
405, 410 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing that “[w]hat we have learned about the 
fallibility of dogs in the years since Place was decided would itself be reason to call for 
reconsidering Place’s decision”). 
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1.  Sui Generis:150 A Limiting Descriptor now Used Expansively for 
Canine Sniffs 
Prior to Place, it was believed that detection dogs did not make 
mistakes that resulted in invasions of privacy.  In other words, when 
mistakes were made, they inured to the benefit of the suspect not the 
police.151  In view of that era’s background assumption concerning 
detection-dog accuracy, it is not surprising that the Place Court 
expressed complete confidence in the canine sniff technique; the 
Court’s view was simply a reflection of what was accepted as true at 
the time.152  Both Place and Jacobsen were premised, in large part, 
on the fact that the testing at issue—the canine sniff and the field 
testing of the white powder—was accurate.153  In language that has 
had important substantive ramifications for canine home-sniffs, the 
Place Court explained that the canine sniff is “sui generis” because 
the sniff was less intrusive than the traditional rummaging associated 
with a physical search and the sniff disclosed only limited information 
(the presence or absence of contraband).154  Therefore, accuracy and 
 
150 The term, “sui generis,” is defined as: “Of its own kind or class; unique or peculiar.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009). 
151 Interestingly, several pre-Place lower courts specifically mentioned errors made by 
detection dogs, but viewed such mistakes as harmless since the mistakes were actually 
false negatives rather than false positives.  See, e.g., United States v. Beale, 674 F. 2d 
1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1982) (observing that “any mistake is one of omission, favoring the 
suspect”), vacated, 463 U.S. 1202 (1983) (vacating the judgment and remanding for 
further consideration in light of United States v. Place); see also United States v. Jodoin, 
672 F.2d 232, 236 (1st Cir. 1982) (quoting dog handlers as saying “dogs are not foolproof, 
they are less accurate on hot muggy days, and drug traffickers have found ways to mask 
the odors of contraband to fool detection efforts” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1975) (observing that while a 
detection dog “may be in error[,] her mistake favors the suspect”). 
152 See Thomas H. Peebles, The Uninvited Canine Nose and the Right to Privacy: Some 
Thoughts on Katz and Dogs, 11 GA. L. REV. 75, 100 (1976) (describing the fact that 
“mistakes work in favor of the suspect” as the key difference between canine sniffs and 
other forms of surveillance); Max A. Hansen, Comment, United States v. Solis: Have the 
Government’s Supersniffers Come Down with a Case of Constitutional Nasal 
Congestion?, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 410, 417 (1976) (observing that “[w]here the use of 
drug detection dogs is concerned, the first objection [regarding canine reliability] is 
lessened because a detector dog’s mistake usually benefits the criminal”). 
153 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (observing that “[i]t is probably 
safe to assume that virtually all of the tests conducted under circumstances comparable to 
those disclosed by this record would result in a positive finding; in such cases, no 
legitimate interest has been compromised”); see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 
707 (1983) (observing that such a sniff discloses only “limited” information because it 
“discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item”). 
154 See Place, 462 U.S. at 707. 
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the harmlessness of any potential canine sniff miscue was the 
background understanding of the Place era. 
In reality, however, error rates for drug-detection dogs undermine 
the Court’s accuracy justification for treating the canine sniff as a sui 
generis practice.  As Justice Souter’s Caballes dissent reflects, drug-
detection dogs are wrong a surprising amount of the time.155  
Additionally, courts have accepted as “reliable” detection dogs with 
even higher error rates than the cases referenced in Justice Souter’s 
Caballes dissent156  Evaluating Place’s justifications and determining 
whether time has borne them out is made more difficult by the 
Court’s use of sui generis language, however.  In practice, lower 
courts have seized on the sui generis label but have forgotten the 
justifications that led the Court to use the label.157  By giving 
substantive weight to the sui generis descriptor, lower courts 
effectively ignore the accuracy justifications of Place and Jacobson 
by injecting probably cause-based language into their analyses of 
whether a given drug-detection dog is sufficiently reliable.158  For 
these courts, the question then boils down to whether there is simply a 
 
155 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The 
infallible dog, however, is a creature of legal fiction.”).  Justice Souter documented cases 
in which dogs were accepted by a court as reliable with an accuracy rate of 71%, see 
United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1378 (10th Cir. 1997), an error rate of 8% over 
a dog’s entire career, see United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 n.3 (10th Cir. 
1997), and an error rate of between 7% and 38%, see United States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 
794, 797 (7th Cir. 2001).  Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411–12. 
156 See, e.g., United States v. Koon Chung Wu, 217 F. App’x 240, 246 (4th Cir.) 
(accepting as “reliable” a drug-detection dog with demonstrated field accuracy of 67% and 
observing that “[b]ecause the probable cause-standard does not require that the officer’s 
belief be more likely true than false, . . . an accuracy rate of sixty percent is more than 
reliable enough for Cody’s alert to have established probable cause” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1110 (2007); United States v. 
Cantrall, 762 F. Supp. 875, 882 (D. Kan. 1991) (accepting as reliable any detection 
percentage over fifty percent, along with dog training and certification in narcotics 
detection). 
157 See, e.g., State v. Jardines, 9 So. 3d 1, 5 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (“Dogs have 
been used to detect scents for centuries all without modification or ‘improvement’ to their 
noses.  That, perhaps, is why the Supreme Court describes them as ‘sui generis’ in 
Place.”), review granted, 3 So. 3d 1246 (Fla. 2009); People v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 224, 228 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (describing Place’s holding as a “general categorization of canine 
sniffs as nonsearches”). 
158 See Koon Chung Wu, 217 F. App’x at 246 (4th Cir.) (“Probable cause only requires 
a ‘fair probability’ that contraband will be found in a certain place, . . . and Cody’s positive 
alerts to the packages in both searches clearly established a fair probability that the 
packages contained controlled substances, given his training and certification as a drug-
detection dog” (internal citation omitted)). 
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“fair probability” that a given drug-detection dog will be correct, 
making the accuracy justification essentially disappear.159 
While the accuracy of the information revealed was arguably only 
an implicit basis for approving the canine sniff procedure in Place,160 
the Court expressly endorsed the canine sniff technique based on its 
accuracy in United States v. Jacobsen.161  Perhaps that should be the 
end of the sui generis discussion.  The Place Court’s accuracy 
assumption has not withstood the test of time, and that alone, at a 
minimum, should be enough to limit the technique’s applicability to 
the circumstances previously articulated in Place162 and Caballes.163  
In fact, as Justice Souter argued in his Caballes dissent, the canine 
sniff accuracy questions that have emerged since Place provide 
sufficient grounds to reconsider the Place decision itself.164  Analysis 
of Place’s justifications has been made unnecessarily slippery, 
however, because of the Court’s use of the sui generis descriptor.165  
It is difficult to meaningfully criticize, or even critique, a doctrine 
when an ambiguous label has been used to describe it.166  Therefore, 
 
159 See id.  It is enough for some courts that the detection dog has been trained and 
certified, without any consideration of the dog’s track record in the field.  See United 
States v. Sundby, 186 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1999) (observing that “a search warrant 
based on a drug dog’s alert is facially sufficient if the affidavit states the dog is trained and 
certified to detect drugs”). 
160 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (observing that because the 
sniff revealed “only the presence or absence of narcotics . . . [t]his limited disclosure also 
ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and 
inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods”). 
161 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (comparing field testing at issue to a 
canine sniff). 
162 See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (applying the canine sniff technique to luggage located in 
a public place). 
163 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (applying the canine sniff 
technique to a lawfully stopped vehicle). 
164 See id. at 410 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
165 An analogous sort of confusion has been generated by the Latin phrase, “res ipsa 
loquitur.”  Creekmore v. United States, 905 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting 
Professor Prosser as stating that res ipsa loquitur “has been the source of so much trouble 
to the courts that the use of the phrase itself has become a definite obstacle to any clear 
thought, and it might better be discarded entirely” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 
also Ballard v. N. British Ry. Co., 1923 S.L.T. 219, 226 (Scot. 1923) (observing that “[i]f 
this phrase had not been in Latin, no one would have called it a principle”). 
166 Cf. State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 138–39 (Minn. 2002) (Page, J., concurring) 
(“The U.S. Supreme Court dismisses the intrusiveness of a dog search by labeling it ‘sui 
generis.’ . . . This is convenient, but lacks any persuasive force given that the dog is used 
to detect the very thing the officers would look for themselves if the Fourth Amendment 
did not limit their ability to do so.” (citation omitted)). 
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it may prove helpful to gain a better understanding of the Court’s use 
of the sui generis label in other cases, particularly in the Fourth 
Amendment context, to determine whether the label should imply any 
meaning other than a descriptive one. 
The term “sui generis” appears in 105 U.S. Supreme Court 
opinions, most of which are simply descriptive of the unique factual 
circumstances at issue that warranted one-of-a-kind treatment by the 
Court.167  In fact, the term “sui generis” often appears in dissenting 
opinions as a pejorative—used to suggest that the majority had 
sidestepped the real issue in the case and, therefore, created a rule of 
almost no value in future decision making.168  Although some lower 
courts have used Place’s sui generis label as an “open sesame,”169 sui 
generis terminology is actually intended to convey both a narrowly 
defined rule and the narrow circumstances under which the rule is 
applicable.  For example, in Dunaway v. New York, also a Fourth 
Amendment case, the Court refused to interpret Terry170 expansively 
to allow custodial interrogation of a suspect at the station house on the 
basis of reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause.171  As the 
Dunaway Court explained, Terry created a “special category” of 
Fourth Amendment seizures that were substantially less intrusive than 
a traditional arrest because the detention involved a “brief, on-the-
spot stop on the street,” which the Court viewed as reasonable under 
its balancing test.172  Although Terry did not use the term sui generis, 
the Court in Dunaway used the label to describe Terry, explaining that 
“[i]nstead [because the intrusion was less than that associated with a 
traditional arrest], the Court treated the stop-and-frisk intrusion as a 
sui generis rubric of police conduct.”173  The Dunaway Court was 
 
167 See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 520 (2000) (Bureau of Indian Affairs); 
Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573 (1984) (student financial aid programs); 
Robertson v. Rosenthal, 132 U.S. 460, 464 (1889) (steel hair pins). 
168 See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 47 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  In 
Santana, the defendant was seen standing in the doorway of a house and retreated into the 
vestibule upon announcement of police.  Id. at 40.  Justice Marshall protested the Court’s 
failure to consider the then-unresolved question of entry into a home to make a warrantless 
arrest, and instead, reached a decision that “appears sui generis, [in that it is] useful only in 
arresting persons who are ‘as exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch’ . . . as 
though in the unprotected outdoors.”  Id.  (citation omitted). 
169 See supra note 157. 
170 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also supra note 61. 
171 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212–13 (1979). 
172 See Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209–10 (stressing that Terry was “narrowly defined”). 
173 See id. at 209 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). 
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careful to emphasize, however, the narrow circumstances that made 
Terry reasonable.174 
The Dunaway Court therefore required a close connection between 
a one-of-a-kind police practice (stop and frisk) and the justifications 
for departing from traditional Fourth Amendment requirements, and 
in doing so, concluded that custodial interrogation of a suspect at the 
station house on the basis of reasonable suspicion was not sufficiently 
close to Terry’s justifications.  In the canine sniff context, one-of-a-
kind treatment of the canine sniff technique means that this practice, 
too, must be closely tied to the justifications that led the Court to 
conclude that a sniff was not a “search.”  Otherwise, the sui generis 
label would not simply be descriptive; it would convey substantive 
meaning on its own.  The Court would likely reject such a view since 
it has disapproved of lower courts’ attempts to “rope off” a legal issue 
through the use of the sui generis label in lieu of meaningful legal 
analysis.175  Therefore, it is crucial to determine whether canine sniffs 
of the home are consistent with the narrow circumstances that the sui 
generis label is meant to describe.176 
2.  Frozen in Time: Sui Generis Label Shields Drug-Detection Sniffs 
from Advances in Scientific Understanding 
Courts that apply the Place/Jacobsen analysis describe their legal 
analysis as a “binary” inquiry.  As Judge Moylan, on the Maryland 
Court of Special Appeals, writing for the majority explained: 
 
174 See id. at 210 (observing that “[b]ecause Terry involved an exception to the general 
rule requiring probable cause, this Court has been careful to maintain its narrow scope”).  
In the only other Fourth Amendment case that uses the term sui generis as a discussion 
point, the dissent used the label to argue for a more narrow interpretation of an earlier case 
than the one used by the plurality.  See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 597 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (protesting the Court’s relaxation of the probable cause standard by 
its expansive interpretation of Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), and 
explaining that an expansive reading was not proper because “Brinegar itself was very 
carefully limited to situations involving the arrest of those driving moving vehicles, . . . a 
problem that has typically been treated as sui generis by this Court” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
175 See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 376 (1974) 
(disagreeing with the Third Circuit’s assumption regarding the existence of a “public 
policy disfavoring compulsory arbitration of safety disputes,” which the Third Circuit had 
viewed as “sui generis”); see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 761–62 (1973) 
(disagreeing with the district court’s suggestion that Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971), 
“in accepting total deviations of 11.9% in a county reapportionment[,] was sui generis”). 
176 Cf. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209 n.11, 210 (requiring that the “intrusion must be 
carefully tailored to the rationale justifying it” and observing that the Court had been 
“careful to maintain [Terry’s] narrow scope”). 
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 The raison d’etre for treating a dog sniff as a non-search is that 
the binary nature of its inquiry, “contraband ‘yea’ or ‘nay’?,” 
precludes the possibility of infringing any expectation of privacy 
that society objectively considers to be legitimate.  If the possession 
of narcotics in an automobile or a suitcase is illegitimate, so too is 
the possession of narcotics in a home.  It is the criminal nature of 
the possession itself that takes the activity out from under the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment, not the place where the 
possession occurs.177 
These courts focus exclusively on the unlawfulness of contraband 
possession without any consideration of the circumstances under 
which the contraband is possessed.  For example, in Fitzgerald v. 
State, the court distinguished Karo178 and Kyllo179 from a canine 
home-sniff because both Karo and Kyllo involved the tracking of 
noncontraband items (ether in Karo and excessive heat in Kyllo) once 
the item became a “detail of the home.”180  The Fitzgerald court 
pointed out that ether, for example, was “a non-contraband item with 
many legitimate, as well as illegitimate, uses.”181  The comparison to 
detection of methyl benzoate molecules in the canine sniff context is 
unavoidable.  As discussed in Part I, scientific research has shown 
that detection dogs likely alert to the volatile methyl benzoate 
molecule, not to cocaine itself.182  Methyl benzoate, like ether, has 
many legitimate uses and, unlike ether, is probably present in the 
ordinary household.183  This scientific research therefore undermines 
these courts’ reliance on the lawful/unlawful character of the 
substance or item being tracked as a distinguishing basis to support 
canine home-sniffs.  Similar to the thermal imager’s detection of 
excessive heat in Kyllo, detection of methyl benzoate allows police to 
infer that illegal contraband is also present.  As Kyllo instructs, police 
inferencing about the contents of a home that is made possible by 
 
177 Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1030 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003), aff’d, 864 A.2d 
1006 (Md. 2004). 
178 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
179 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
180 Fitzgerald, 837 A.2d at 1036 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38). 
181 Id. (observing that “[e]ther is not contraband and its mere possession is entirely 
lawful. . . . Thus, Karo is factually distinct from both Place and Jacobsen, where the 
procedure disclosed only the presence or absence of a contraband item” (quoting United 
States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 474 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1989)) (emphasis omitted) (omission in 
original)). 
182 See supra notes 32–38 and accompanying text. 
183 See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing methyl benzoate as being 
present in insecticides, solvents, and perfumes). 
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sense-enhancing technology is a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The potential detection of noncontraband information was crucial 
to one federal court asked to consider a suspicionless canine sniff by 
an explosives-detection dog at a traffic stop.184  Although the facts in 
United States v. Esparza are clearly analogous to those of Caballes, 
the judge distinguished the two sniffs on the fact that explosives-
detection dogs are “trained to detect ammonium nitrate, a chemical 
found in [ordinary] household items such as fertilizer and printer 
cartridges.”185  Therefore, similar to the thermal imager at issue in 
Kyllo, the sniff by an explosives-detection dog was capable of 
detecting lawful activity and thereby violated the Fourth 
Amendment.186  For purposes of drug-detection sniffs, on the other 
hand, the Court’s use of the sui generis descriptor has crystallized 
understanding of such sniffs to the assumptions of the day in 1983, 
seemingly making impermissible what would otherwise be a clear 
analogy to Kyllo’s ban on sense enhancement that might reveal 
noncontraband information. 
As a further thought, reliance on the contraband/noncontraband 
character of the item being tracked is too simplistic from a legal 
perspective as well.  As four members of the Court recently reminded, 
“[t]he Fourth Amendment does not seek to protect contraband, yet we 
have required suppression of contraband seized in an unlawful 
search.”187  Therefore, courts that focus exclusively on the illegality 
of the item are missing the point.  The Supreme Court requires 
 
184 United States v. Esparza, No. CR-07-14-S-BLW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66455, at 
*6 (D. Idaho Sept. 7, 2007) (finding a suspicionless sniff of a vehicle by an explosives-
detection dog was a “search” because the dog detected both contraband and noncontraband 
items and because the facts did not raise any “special need” to sniff for explosives based 
on any imminent danger to national security). 
185 Id. at *6.  Although not discussed in the case, the judge’s findings on this issue 
appear to be borne out by the scientific literature concerning explosives-detection sniffs.  
Explosives-detection dogs “respond to the most-volatile compounds present in an 
explosive, not necessarily to the explosive species itself.”  See Sniffers, supra note 34, at 
207 (explaining that when detecting plastic explosives, the dog is not responding to the 
explosive component RDX, “which has a very low vapor pressure,” but instead “to 
compounds like cyclohexanone, a solvent used in RDX production”). 
186 Esparza, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66455, at *7. 
187 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 621 (2006) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 
48, 53–54 (1951) (explaining that “Congress, in abrogating property rights in [contraband 
drugs], merely intended to aid in their forfeiture and thereby prevent the spread of the 
traffic in drugs rather than to abolish the exclusionary rule formulated by the courts in 
furtherance of the high purposes of the Fourth Amendment”). 
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determinations of whether an unlawful search has occurred and 
whether it is appropriate to apply an exclusionary remedy under the 
circumstances.188  By categorizing all canine sniffs as permissible, 
and focusing exclusively on the object of the sniff, these lower courts 
never analyze the lawfulness of the circumstances of the underlying 
sniff.  Courts have never accepted such a simplistic model.  For 
example, where a canine sniff of a person is contemplated, courts 
have routinely required suspicion, at least in nonborder situations.189  
While the courts in the schoolchild sniff cases focused on the fact that 
a person, rather than an unattended item, was being sniffed,190 the key 
point is that these courts analyzed the circumstances under which the 
canine sniff was performed.  In other words, these courts recognized 
that canine sniffs were not per se outside the boundaries of Fourth 
Amendment protections.  By focusing on the context of the sniff, 
these courts concluded that the sniff of a schoolchild was too intrusive 
to be performed without individualized suspicion.191  The school sniff 
cases demonstrate that considering the circumstances of a canine sniff 
is nothing new, and serve as a clear indicator that evaluating the 
intrusiveness of a canine sniff is appropriate in other privacy-sensitive 
circumstances as well.  Refusing to consider the context of the canine 
sniff, in favor of focusing on the contraband for which the dog is 
sniffing, is therefore wrong. 
 
188 See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 599 (finding “knock-and-announce” violation but refusing 
to suppress evidence seized in a search pursuant to a search warrant because imposition of 
an exclusionary remedy was “unjustified”). 
189 The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have concluded that a canine 
sniff of a schoolchild is a “search” that required a showing of individualized suspicion.  
See B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1267–68 (9th Cir. 1999); Horton v. 
Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982).  But see Doe v. Renfrow, 
631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding close contact sniff was not a search).  For a further 
discussion of the issue, United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(permitting the suspicionless canine sniff of a person at an international border). 
190 See Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d at 1266 (distinguishing between the canine 
sniff of a person and unattended luggage); Horton, 690 F.2d at 478 (recognizing that “the 
interest in the integrity of one’s person, and the fourth amendment applies with its fullest 
vigor against any intrusion on the human body”). 
191 See Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d at 1266 (agreeing with the Fifth Circuit’s 
analysis); Horton, 690 F.2d at 479 (observing that “[i]ntentional close proximity sniffing 
of the person is offensive whether the sniffer be canine or human”). 
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3. “Remoteness” as a Justification for Excluding Canine Sniffs from 
Fourth Amendment Requirements: Possible Semantic and Temporal 
Interpretations and Their Impact on Canine Sniff Jurisprudence 
To determine whether a canine home-sniff is tied closely enough to 
the justifications for treating the technique as a nonsearch, it is 
important to examine the Court’s expectations and assumptions 
concerning the canine sniff technique.  As the Jacobsen Court 
observed, “[h]ere, as in Place, the likelihood that official conduct of 
the kind disclosed by the record will actually compromise any 
legitimate interest in privacy seems much too remote to characterize 
the testing as a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.”192 
On the one hand, this discussion provides clear substantiation of an 
accuracy-based justification for the police investigative tool at issue.  
In other words, the Jacobsen Court, in its “remoteness” discussion, 
could be characterizing the testing involved, both the field testing and 
the canine sniff described in Place, as being so accurate that the odds 
of not finding contraband, and therefore instead finding private, 
noncontraband information in the ensuing search, are “much too 
remote” to view the police investigative tool as a “search.”  This 
semantic interpretation of “remoteness” is consistent with Place in 
that Place’s description of detection dogs as sui generis appeared to 
be based on both the dog’s accuracy and the limited intrusiveness of 
the sniff itself.193  Additionally, lower courts have explained 
remoteness in semantic terms as well.  For example, in Fitzgerald v. 
State, the court viewed the likelihood that a drug-detection dog would 
alert on medically prescribed marijuana as too remote to be 
meaningful for purposes of Place.194 
On the other hand, “remoteness” could also be interpreted in a 
temporal sense.  The idea here would be that the eventual search of 
the person’s now-suspicious item should be severed analytically from 
 
192 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984) (emphasis added). 
193 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (observing that determining 
whether contraband is present through a canine sniff does not require opening the suitcase 
and implicitly assuming the accuracy of the technique); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 
U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing that classification of the canine 
sniff technique as “sui generis” was based on the limited intrusiveness of the sniff and its 
accuracy). 
194 See Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1028 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (observing 
that “[t]he marijuana in the Place case, for instance, might conceivably have been 
medically prescribed in a state such as California.  The critical holding of the Court, 
however, was not to be foreclosed by a mere ‘remote’ possibility.”), aff’d, 864 A.2d 1006 
(Md. 2004). 
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the original sniff or field test that produced the suspicion toward the 
item.  A temporal interpretation of remoteness would therefore allow 
the Court to disconnect the use of the police investigative tool from 
the inevitable consequences of that use—the search.  By looking at 
these steps in isolation, the Court could ignore the consequences of a 
false-positive triggering event.  In other words, the exposure of 
private, noncontraband information as a result of a false-positive 
canine alert would be “too remote” to reflect back, in some 
constitutional sense, on the search-triggering investigative tool. 
The answer to the “remoteness” question has important 
implications for the ongoing vitality of the Jacobsen premise.  If the 
semantic interpretation for “remoteness” is the proper one, then 
changes in our understanding of both the accuracy of drug-sniffing 
dogs, in general, and societal views on what is “contraband” take 
center stage.  In other words, if drug-detection dogs are not as 
accurate as once assumed or if lawful citizens increasingly store 
prescription medications in their homes that detection dogs would 
interpret to be contraband, then the likelihood that legitimate interests 
in noncontraband information remaining undisturbed is, in fact, not 
“remote.” 
The Supreme Court may be pressing the temporal, rather than the 
semantic, view of remoteness, however.  As the Caballes Court 
explained: 
Although respondent argues that the error rates, particularly the 
existence of false positives, call into question the premise that drug-
detection dogs alert only to contraband, the record contains no 
evidence or findings that support his argument.  Moreover, 
respondent does not suggest that an erroneous alert, in and of itself, 
reveals any legitimate private information, and, in this case, the trial 
judge found that the dog sniff was sufficiently reliable to establish 
probable cause to conduct a full-blown search of the trunk.195 
It is not clear from this statement whether the majority concluded, in 
some definitional sense, that a false positive from a reliable detection 
dog, by itself, was incapable of revealing legitimate private 
information or, instead, that Caballes had simply failed to make this 
argument.  Significantly, however, the context of the Court’s 
discussion suggests the former and not the latter.  Perhaps, the Court 
recognizes that an accuracy-based foundation for permissive use of 
canine sniffs is becoming increasingly shaky.  To address the problem 
of false alerts and how such alerts undermine the canine sniff 
 
195 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (emphasis added). 
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technique’s justifications, the Court may be willing to sever the 
connection between the canine sniff and the ensuing search. 
Surgically separating the false-positive sniff (which Caballes 
claims reveals no “legitimate private information”) from the eventual 
police rummaging in response to the erroneous alert (which 
apparently is also not a “search” so long as the dog that gave the false 
alert was “sufficiently reliable”)196 represents a genuine drift beyond 
the now-suspect accuracy and limited intrusiveness justifications 
expressed in Place.  Further, it is inconsistent with the Court’s earlier 
express refusal to sever the search and seizure issues in a case 
involving contraband drugs.197  The Caballes Court’s surprising 
statement concerning false positives represents an implicit 
acknowledgment that it needs to patch the hole in canine sniff 
jurisprudence that has become evident in the years following Place.  
“Reliable” drug-detection dogs make plenty of mistakes.198  To 
suggest that a false-positive alert reveals no private information is an 
artificial conclusion, if ever there was one, because the alert leads 
directly and inevitably to police rummaging during which private, 
noncontraband items are uncovered.199 
This Caballes dicta may have a real impact on the home-sniff 
question.  There is no data on the accuracy of drug-detection dogs 
asked to sniff the exterior of a person’s home.200  The data presently 
available concern the accuracy of detection dogs that are asked to 
scent in close proximity to the container suspected of secreting 
contraband (e.g., luggage, a vehicle, or an interior room).201  It is far 
from clear that existing data concerning luggage and vehicle searches 
should be unquestioningly extended to establish “reliability” for 
canine sniffs of the home.  First, the detection dog is not able to gain 
the same proximity to the contraband item as is typically the case 
 
196 Id. 
197 See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951); see also supra note 100. 
198 See supra notes 151–52, 155-56 and accompanying text. 
199 As Justice Souter explained, “[n]or is it significant that Kyllo’s imaging device 
would disclose personal details immediately, whereas they would be revealed only in the 
further step of opening the enclosed space following the dog’s alert reaction; in practical 
terms the same values protected by the Fourth Amendment are at stake in each case.”  
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 413 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
200 For a discussion of the fact that canine certification for drug detection is limited to 
testing for drugs hidden in vehicles or indoor, interior rooms, rather than perimeter 
searches of buildings, see supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
201 See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
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during vehicle or luggage sniffs.202  A dog that is “reliable” for 
purposes of sniffing luggage in close proximity at an airport may not 
be as effective in a residential setting.203  Significantly, however, no 
data exist to allow meaningful review of canine reliability in these 
newer factual situations.204 
Second, home occupants have less control over the people who 
access their front door and associated curtilage areas.  Although there 
are exceptions,205 the front door is an open curtilage location where 
homeowners typically anticipate interacting with nonfamily members 
and others.  The overall lack of control over who comes and goes 
from these curtilage areas creates the risk that a drug-detection dog 
could alert to contraband waste molecules206 left behind by others—
 
202 For a discussion of the “scanning” process that drug-detection canines use to locate 
the scent source of narcotics, see supra notes 43–50 and accompanying text.  See also 
Fredric I. Lederer & Calvin M. Lederer, Admissibility of Evidence Found by Marijuana 
Detection Dogs, ARMY LAW., Apr. 1973, at 12, 12 (describing a pattern of  properly 
conducted canine-assisted barracks searches).  “While the dog may detect airborne scent 
and follow it to its source, more likely the dog will have to smell the immediate proximity 
of an area to detect marijuana within it.”  Id. (second emphasis added). 
203 In fact, the scientific literature, discussed in Part I, reveals that proximity is an 
important consideration in both detecting the drug and properly identifying the scent 
source.  See supra notes 43–50 and accompanying text. 
204 See R v. Kang-Brown, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456, 2008 1 S.C.C. 18 ¶ 15 (Can.); see also 
supra note 51.  As the Canadian Supreme Court observed, little empirical research on the 
accuracy of detection dogs exists.  Kang-Brown, 2008 1 S.C.C. ¶ 15.  One study, 
conducted in Australia, was reported by the Privacy Ombudsman of New South Wales in 
2004.  The research revealed that seventy-three percent of those searched on the basis of a 
positive alert from a drug-detection dog were found not to be in possession of illegal 
drugs.  NEW SOUTH WALES OMBUDSMAN, DISCUSSION PAPER: REVIEW OF THE POLICE 
POWERS (DRUG DETECTION DOGS) ACT 16 fig.3 (2004) [hereinafter NSW OMBUDSMAN 
2004].  While sixty-one percent of the false positives were attributable to the “residual 
odour” thought to be related to the individual’s admission of use or contact with others 
who had used drugs; thirty-nine percent of the false positives could not be explained.  Id. 
at 23–24.  In 2006, the Privacy Ombudsman issued a new report concerning the use of 
detection dogs.  NEW SOUTH WALES OMBUDSMAN, REVIEW OF THE POLICE POWERS 
(DRUG DETECTION DOGS) ACT (2006) [hereinafter NSW OMBUDSMAN 2006].  Therein, it 
was determined that seventy-four percent of those searched did not possess illegal drugs.  
Id. at 53. 
205 Many, if not most, homes and apartments lack gates, signage that forbids entry, 
locked vestibules (for apartments), or ironically, dogs that could be thought of as 
restricting public access to the front door.  The issue of impeded access to the front door is 
an important consideration to lower courts asked to consider the home-sniff issue.  See, 
e.g., People v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 224, 229 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008). 
206 See United States v. Brooks, 589 F. Supp. 2d 618, 630–31 (E.D. Va. 2008) 
(observing that “drug dogs alert in the presence of an odor—even if the controlled 
substance is no longer present at the site of the alert”); State v. Cabral, 859 A.2d 285, 289 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (detailing a canine handler’s testimony that, based upon 
training, “residual odor of a drug can last up to 72 hours”). 
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even a marijuana seed dropped from a visitor’s pocket onto the 
doormat.207  This lack of control over the location combined with the 
dog’s inability to gain proximity to the supposed contraband suggests 
that, at the very least, scientific data is needed to support the 
conclusion that dogs are sufficiently reliable when sniffing homes. 
Additionally, Caballes’s dicta concerning canine sniff error rates 
may generate other problems in the home-sniff context.  The scope of 
the search generated by a false positive is far more expansive in the 
residential context.208  While any search based on a false-positive 
canine sniff reveals private, noncontraband information, this is 
especially troubling when the sniffed location is a private 
residence.209  The search of luggage based on a positive canine sniff 
is confined to the luggage, and the same is true of a vehicle.  While 
the probable cause-based search of an item or vehicle might well be 
probing,210 the scope of the search is defined by the size of the 
container to which the detection dog has alerted.  An alert on a private 
residence creates suspicion toward a very sizeable container 
indeed.211  A search warrant, issued in reliance on a positive canine 
sniff, would permit a search that is significantly more intrusive than 
the searches in Place or Caballes because of both the size of the 
suspected contraband container and the fact that any search for drugs 
would likely involve a top-to-bottom perusal of the home’s every 
 
207 Cf. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 949, 950 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing a drug-detection dog’s alert to marijuana “residue” 
consisting of stems and seeds of an estimated weight of less than one gram, which the 
Florida State Trooper testified was too small in amount to recover because “[i]t was 
embedded in the carpet and would have taken tweezers to recover”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
208 Of course, absent exigent circumstances, a warrant is required to enter a home.  See 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587–88 (1980). 
209 It is widely accepted that a positive canine alert can produce probable cause to 
support the ensuing search for contraband.  See, e.g., Jones, 755 N.W.2d at 226 n.2 
(observing that “[t]here is no dispute that a positive reaction by a properly trained 
narcotics dog can establish probable cause to believe that contraband is present”).  But see 
United States v. Olivas, No. 3:09-CR-1402-KC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62270, at *12 n.5 
(W.D. Tex. July 17, 2009) (finding “merit to the argument that an alert from a detector 
dog, even when that dog is well-trained, cannot by itself constitute probable cause to 
search under any circumstances”). 
210 See generally Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (permitting police to 
slash upholstery of a vehicle in a search for illegal alcohol supported by probable cause). 
211 See State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1190 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.) (observing that 
“[v]ehicles on public roadways and luggage in airports are simply different because the 
privacy to be invaded by government’s prying eyes is necessarily limited by the size of the 
vehicle or bag, plus only the effects of one’s traveling life chosen to appear outside the 
home and in public are at risk of exhibition”), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1052 (2006). 
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nook and cranny.212  The intrusion on privacy from a false-positive 
alert would be vast, turning Place’s justification about limitations on 
the information revealed on its head.213  In view of the size of the 
private residence “container,” unblinking expansion of the Caballes 
dicta to canine home-sniffs does not make sense. 
Additionally, drug-detection dogs have been known to alert on a 
wide variety of items, including: controlled, nonnarcotic 
medications;214 noncontraband medications;215 and various 
substances.216  In the school-sniff cases, while the issue generally 
 
212 See United States v. Jackson, No. IP 03-79-CR-1H/F, 2004 WL 1784576, at *5 
(S.D. Ind. Feb. 2, 2004) (stating that a search warrant issued on the basis of a positive 
canine sniff of a residence would allow “of course, a top-to-bottom search of a home for 
controlled substances, which can be concealed almost anywhere, can be an extremely 
thorough intrusion into a home”). 
213 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (observing that the canine sniff 
revealed “limited” information about the contents of luggage, which “ensures that the 
owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in 
less discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods”). 
214 Cf. Fitzgerald v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1018 (Md. 2004) (refusing to consider the 
defendant’s argument that a drug-detection dog was trained to alert on diazepam, the 
generic for Valium, because the issue was not raised at trial).  For further discussion, see 
NSW OMBUDSMAN 2004, supra note 204, at 26, which documents a false-positive alert on 
a woman in Australia that was attributed to the fact that she was carrying her son’s ADD 
medication in her purse, and NSW OMBUDSMAN 2006, supra note 204, at 52–53, which 
documents alerts on various prescription medicines, including flu medication, Valium, and 
methadone, and notes that “[a]lthough drug detection dogs are not trained to detect 
methadone or prescription drugs, we are not aware of any training performed to eliminate 
possible false positives with these drugs.”  Cf. John M. Dunn, Illinois v. Caballes: The Day 
the Supreme Court Lost Its Dog Kyllo, 76 OKLA. BAR J. 1791, 1794 (2005). 
[I]t is important to note that there are several prescription drugs that contain an 
amphetamine as the active ingredient.  Drug dogs are trained to smell 
amphetamines in order to detect methamphetamines.  However, Ritalin, 
Dexedrine and Adderall are drugs commonly used to treat Attention Deficit 
Disorder/Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder which contain amphetamines as 
their active ingredient. . . . Since the prescription medications are not contraband, 
their owner should enjoy a legitimate expectation of privacy. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
215 See Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1989); Horton 
v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 474 (5th Cir. 1982) (observing that the 
drug-detection dogs involved were “trained to alert their handlers to the presence of any 
one of approximately sixty different substances, including alcohol and drugs, both over-
the-counter and controlled”).  The plaintiff in Jennings argued that the detection canine 
was “capable of reacting to some nonprescription drugs and to residual scents lingering for 
up to four to six weeks.”  Jennings, 877 F.2d at 317.  The dog alerted to, among other 
things, asthma medication and a Primatene inhaler.  Id. at 318. 
216 See, e.g., Jennings, 877 F.2d at 318 (discussing the detection dog’s alert to beer 
caps, empty beer bottles and cans, and the scent of previously vomited beer); Horton, 690 
F.2d at 474 (discussing alcohol). 
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turned on the lawfulness of a canine sniff of a schoolchild217 and the 
resulting searches in some of those cases were extremely troubling,218 
the scope of the search was limited to the person of the sniffed student 
and the student’s on-campus possessions.  Without minimizing the 
intrusiveness of a canine sniff of a person or the ensuing search that 
results from an alert, the search of a home on the basis of a positive 
canine sniff would be both probing and expansive.  Therefore, 
because detection dogs have been known to alert on such ubiquitous 
substances as beer, asthma medication, and over-the-counter 
medications, a search on the basis of a positive canine sniff may result 
in a significant invasion of privacy when the sniffed location is a 
private home.219 
As a final observation, states are adopting, in increasing numbers, 
statutes related to medical marijuana, most of which allow possession 
of between one to eight ounces of marijuana by a qualified patient.220  
For obvious reasons, it is preferable to have such patients store and 
use this medication in their homes rather than storing it in their 
vehicles, thus creating the temptation to use this medication while 
driving.  Medical marijuana is in the unusual position of being a legal 
medication in these states, assuming the qualified patient satisfies the 
state’s applicable laws, but it nevertheless remains a crime to 
manufacture or possess marijuana under the federal Controlled 
Substance Act (CSA).221  This unfortunate dual treatment of medical 
 
217 Horton, 690 F.2d at 473. 
218 See Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (noting that the 
thirteen-year-old junior high school student, who was strip searched to look for drugs after 
a drug-detection dog alerted, had been playing with her own dog, which was in heat, prior 
to school). 
219 Cf. Katz & Golembiewski, supra note 38, at 754–55 (discussing the inability of a 
detection dog to distinguish between illicit substances and pharmaceutical substances and 
noting that pharmaceutical substances may release the same odor as illicit substances). 
220 Thirteen States have legalized medical marijuana. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.71.090, 
17.37.010 to 17.37.080 (2010); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Deering 2010); 
COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 329-121 to 329-128 
(LexisNexis 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383-B(5) (2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 333.26421 (LexisNexis 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-46-101 to -210 (2010); 
NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 38; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-2B-1 to -7 (West 2009); OR. REV. 
STAT. §§ 475.300 to 475.346 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 21-28.6-1 to -11 (2010); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4472-4474d (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 69.51A.005 to 
69.51A.080 (LexisNexis 2010). 
221 Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 
(2006)).  The Court held that the CSA’s categorical prohibition of the manufacture and 
possession of marijuana would include even locally grown marijuana that was used for 
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marijuana creates real risks in the home-sniff context.222  Even if the 
investigating officers, out of deference to a state’s decision to 
decriminalize medical marijuana, wished to avoid home searches on 
the basis of a positive canine alert for marijuana, the drug-detection 
dog has no way to signal that it was “just” marijuana detected in the 
home.223 
B.  Should the Context of a Canine Sniff Be Determinative when the 
Sniffed Location Is a Private Residence? 
As the Court’s opinion states, “the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places.”  The question, however, is what protection it 
affords to those people.  Generally, as here, the answer to that 
question requires reference to a “place.”224 
Absent exigent circumstances, police cannot cross the threshold of 
a home to arrest a person inside or to search the location.225  With the 
canine sniff technique, however, police do not physically cross the 
threshold of a home but can nevertheless deduce information about 
the interior of the home that could not otherwise be verified by visual 
surveillance.  Under the Fourth Amendment, the home is “ordinarily 
afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection.”226  
Significant to the home-sniff question, the area immediately 
 
medical purposes, and that the CSA did not exceed Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15, 28 (2005). 
222 Even the U.S. Department of Justice’s recent clear signal to federal prosecutors, in 
states that have enacted medical marijuana laws, to avoid investigation and prosecution of 
medical users, does not in any way eliminate the risk that a detection dog will alert on 
medical marijuana and that a broad search of the home may result.  Memorandum from 
David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Selected United States 
Attorneys (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf. 
223 But see Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1028 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) 
(dismissing concerns that a canine sniff of a home might reveal medically prescribed 
marijuana as a “mere ‘remote’ possibility,” and observing that the marijuana in Place 
could “conceivably have been medically prescribed in a state such as California” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 846 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004).  In reality, the idea that the 
Place Court predicted the future and factored medically prescribed marijuana into its two-
paragraph canine sniff discussion, as the Fitzgerald court asserts, is the true “remote 
possibility.” 
224 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
225 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (“It is a basic principle of Fourth 
Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
226 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976); Payton, 445 U.S. at 
590 (observing that “the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the 
house”). 
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surrounding and associated with a private home, the curtilage, is also 
afforded Fourth Amendment protection.227  While the Court has 
clearly extended Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage,228 the 
Court has yet to clarify the degree of protection afforded to the 
curtilage as compared to the home itself.229  Further, the front door 
area, where most canine sniffs are performed, is usually accessible to 
the public and therefore enjoys some degree of traffic from 
nonoccupants of the home.  So, while the front door area is likely 
encompassed within a home’s curtilage,230 the home’s occupants 
have little expectation of privacy in items that the public could 
observe while standing at the front door.231  With that said, in cases 
involving surveillance of a private home’s curtilage, the Court has 
been careful to emphasize that the information gained about the 
curtilage was limited to visual observation.232  As the Court has 
explained, visual observation is simply less intrusive than an 
inspection that requires a physical invasion.233 
The Supreme Court’s emphasis in earlier cases on the fact that 
police curtilage observations were made with the naked eye suggests 
 
227 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (observing that “[a]t common law, 
the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity 
of a man’s home and the privacies of life’” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
630 (1886))). 
228 Id. (discussing that curtilage “has been considered part of the home itself for Fourth 
Amendment purposes”). 
229 Id. at 180 n.11 (observing that it was unnecessary under Oliver’s facts “to consider 
the scope of the curtilage exception to the open fields doctrine or the degree of Fourth 
Amendment protection afforded the curtilage, as opposed to the home itself”). 
230 For example, in Ciraolo, the Court noted that the small, fenced-in backyard at issue 
“would appear to encompass this small area within the curtilage.”  California v. Ciraolo, 
476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). 
231 Cf. United States v. Titemore, 437 F.3d 251, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that a 
homeowner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a patch of front lawn visible from 
the road).  The court observed that “it is possible that an area might fall within the 
curtilage of the home, as that concept was defined at common law, but the owner or 
resident may fail to manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in that area.”  Id. at 258. 
232 See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304 (1987) (explaining that in California 
v. Ciraolo, “we held that warrantless naked-eye aerial observation of a home’s curtilage 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  We based our holding on the premise that the 
Fourth Amendment has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield 
their eyes when passing by a home or public thoroughfares.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
233 Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000) (distinguishing California v. 
Ciraolo and Florida v. Riley from a probing palpation of a suspect’s luggage because the 
aerial surveillance cases “involved only visual, as opposed to tactile, observation.  
Physically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection.”). 
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that other, unenhanced sensory determinations would likely also be 
permissible, assuming that the officer was in a curtilage location, like 
the front door, that the home’s occupant would reasonably anticipate 
the public to access.  The Court’s focus in its curtilage discussions has 
been on the lack of sense enhancement, however.  Therefore, it is a 
stretch to conclude that because an officer, during a lawfully 
conducted “knock and talk” encounter234 with a home’s occupant, can 
use the officer’s own nose to detect contraband,235 that the officer 
could instead use a detection dog, whose sense of smell is more than 
eight times sharper than a human’s,236 to do the sniff work.237 
Because the front door is a location that lower courts have 
generally permitted human police officers to access in order to engage 
in consent-based “knock and talk” interaction with a home’s 
occupants, to distinguish the introduction of a police dog from that of 
the human police officer courts must examine: (1) whether there are 
additional intrusions associated with introducing a police dog into the 
curtilage area of a private home that would make the practice 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and (2) whether the 
heightened expectations of privacy associated with the home would 
make the warrantless use of a natural form of technology, such as a 
canine sniff, to deduce information about the interior of a home 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
234 Consent-based police/resident encounters arise when a police officer approaches a 
private home, knocks on the door, and attempts to engage the resident in a consensual 
discussion or a consent-based search of the premises.  See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 199 
F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1110–12 (D. Kan. 2002) (observing that a “knock and talk” encounter is 
normally consensual unless coercive circumstances, such as unreasonable persistence, a 
display of weapons, multiple police officers questioning the occupant, or questioning 
conducted in unusual places or at unusual times, transform the encounter into a “seizure” 
under the Fourth Amendment). 
235 See, e.g., Duhig v. State, 171 S.W.3d 631, 636 (Tex. App. 2005) (allowing officers 
to proceed to an unfenced backyard after receiving no answer to a knock at the front door 
but hearing movement inside the home; officers smelled marijuana coming from an air 
conditioning vent); see also United States v. Charles, 29 F. App’x 892 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(discussing an officer who smelled “growing” marijuana); Traylor v. State, 817 N.E.2d 
611, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that during “knock and talk” at a mobile home, 
officers smelled the strong odor of ether, a chemical commonly used in the manufacture of 
methamphetamine). 
236 See, e.g., United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1982) (observing that 
“[a] trained canine’s sense of smell is more than eight times as sensitive as a human’s”), 
vacated, 463 U.S. 1202 (1983) (remanding for further consideration in light of United 
States v. Place). 
237 Cf. State v. Guillen, 213 P.3d 230, 240 n.11 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (questioning 
whether an implied invitation of public access to curtilage would include implicit consent 
for a visitor to use intrusive equipment to probe the residence). 
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Of central importance to courts that conclude that a canine home-
sniff is not a “search” is the fact that the sniff is performed while the 
detection dog is standing on a location that is accessible to the 
public.238  While public location may be important, it should not be 
presumed to be determinative.  After all, prior to Kyllo, the public 
location from which thermal-imaging scans were conducted was 
essential to courts in concluding that thermal scans were insulated 
from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.239  Kyllo 
informed us differently.240  Therefore, as a threshold matter, it is 
important to consider whether the location of the dog’s paws makes a 
constitutional difference in the canine sniff analysis or, instead, 
whether the focus should be on the intrusiveness of introducing a 
potentially dangerous and, to some, unclean animal into the curtilage 
area of a private home. 
The intrusiveness of police behavior cannot be considered in the 
abstract, since this would amount to nothing more than a subjective 
“vote” about whether the practice “felt” unreasonable.  As the Rakas 
v. Illinois Court explained: “[l]egitimation of expectations of privacy 
by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either 
by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to 
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”241  
Toward that end, the Court has looked to a number of factors in 
 
238 See, e.g., Stabler v. State, 990 So. 2d 1258, 1259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) 
(allowing a canine sniff at the front door of the defendant’s apartment because the front 
door was “open to public access and to a common area”); Nelson v. State, 867 So. 2d 534, 
535 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“Areas outside of a hotel room, such as hallways, which 
are open to use by others may not be reasonably considered as private.”); supra note 99.  
The front door has not always been required as the permissible sniff location, however.  
See United States v. Tarazon-Silva, 960 F. Supp. 1152, 1163 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (permitting 
the canine sniff of a dryer vent because the vent was accessible by standing on a paved 
driveway and the area both was not enclosed and “appears to be readily accessible to 
neighbors, visitors, repairmen, salesmen, utility workers, and/or members of the public”), 
aff’d, 166 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 1998). 
239 Brief for the United States at 15 n.4, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 
99-8508) (observing that the Courts of Appeals had “uniformly held” that the use of a 
thermal imager from a public location to observe the exterior of a dwelling was not a 
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and listing applicable cases). 
240 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (requiring a search warrant to 
perform a thermal-imaging scan of a private home and observing that “[t]he present case 
involves officers on a public street engaged in more than naked-eye surveillance of a 
home”). 
241 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978); see also Georgia v. Randolph, 547 
U.S. 103, 111 (2006) (emphasizing “the great significance given to widely shared social 
expectations” in assessing reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment in consent cases). 
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examining the intrusiveness of police behavior to determine whether a 
warrant is required.242  The Court has “given weight to such factors as 
the intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment,”243 “the uses 
to which the [person] has put a location,”244 “and our societal 
understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous 
protection from government invasion.”245 
1.  Intrusiveness Based on Intimidation 
Although we might prefer to visualize a drug-detection dog as 
being a member of the U.S. Agricultural Department’s “Beagle 
Brigade”246 or a Labrador retriever, like most explosives-detection 
dogs,247 such is not the case.  Drug-detection dogs are often selected 
for the intimidation factor that they produce.248  The intimidation is, 
therefore, intentional.249  When asked, and sometimes when not 
asked, these dogs can be dangerous.  Unlike an ordinary weapon, 
which obviously lacks a mind of its own, the potential exists for a 
dog, even a well-trained dog, to be disobedient.250  Courts that refuse 
 
242 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (observing that “[n]o single 
factor determines whether an individual legitimately may claim under the Fourth 
Amendment that a place should be free of government intrusion not authorized by 
warrant”). 
243 Id. at 178 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1977)). 
244 Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265 (1960)). 
245 Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)). 
246 See supra note 18 (discussing the U.S. Agricultural Department’s choice of beagles 
for detection purposes, in part, because they are “nonaggressive” dogs). 
247 See supra note 22 (discussing the ATF’s choice of Labrador retrievers, in part, 
because they “possess a gentle disposition” that allows them to be used in crowds and 
around children). 
248 See, e.g., Danelle Aboud, Dog Lends City Police a Paw, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr. 
10, 2003, at 6 (observing that police dogs have the “intimidation factor,” causing 
“‘[p]eople [to] react differently when they are stopped and see or hear the barking dog in 
the back of the police car’” (quoting Madison Heights Police Officer David Koehler)); 
Matt Lait, Role Over for Veteran Police Dog, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1991, at B3 (noting that 
although fear is “the handler’s first line of defense,” the genesis of that defense is that 
“[t]he dogs are used more frequently for mere presence and intimidation and searching 
than they are for biting” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
249 See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 
1982) (observing that a representative from the security services firm hired to conduct 
campus sniffs testified that “Doberman pinschers and German shepherds were used 
precisely because of the image maintained by the large dogs”).  Those breeds of dog were 
selected “to maintain an image of strength and ferocity,” id. at 482, although the security 
firm actually chose individual animals on the basis of their docility.  Id. 
250 See Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1549 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that during a 
roadblock for narcotics detection, “one person was bitten by a dog”); Doe v. Renfrow, 475 
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to apply Kyllo in the home-sniff context on the basis that dogs are not 
technological devices cannot also avoid consideration of the 
intrusiveness that arises because dogs are not mechanical devices.  
Simply stated, drug-detection dogs produce fear, intentionally so, in 
the ordinary person.251  There is a societal cost associated with 
introducing intimidating dogs into the curtilage of a private home, and 
the Court has instructed that societal “understandings” are an 
appropriate consideration in determining reasonableness under the 
Fourth Amendment.252 
2.  Intrusiveness Based on Historical Oppression 
While the courts that refuse to apply Kyllo emphasize our societal 
recognition that dogs are familiar and have been used by law 
enforcement for tracking purposes for centuries,253 these courts 
ignore the fact that dogs have also been used as tools of institutional 
oppression for perhaps even longer.  Although dogs have long been 
used by military forces,254 as early as 2500 BC, Egyptians used dogs 
on civilians for purposes of crowd control to protect the pyramids.255  
The Spanish conquistadors used dogs to kill and subdue the native 
 
F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (noting that the thirteen-year-old female schoolchild, 
who was strip searched to look for drugs after a drug-detection dog alerted, had been 
playing with her own dog, which was in heat, prior to school); see also Matthew Pleasant, 
Police Dog Suspended During Attack Investigation, DAILYCOMET.COM, July 23, 2009,  
http://www.dailycomet.com/article/20090723/ARTICLES/907239926/1212?Title=Police  
-dog-suspended-during-attack-investigation (reporting that the detection dog, a Belgian 
malinois, was taken out of service following allegations that the dog escaped its kennel 
and attacked a woman and noting that one of the handler’s previous dogs, also a Belgian 
malinois, mauled a seventy-seven-year-old bicyclist in 2007 after the dog was unleashed). 
251 As Justice Ginsburg noted in her Caballes dissent, “[a] drug-detection dog is an 
intimidating animal.”  Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 421 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); see also id. at 411 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Ginsburg 
in finding that the introduction of a narcotics-detection dog into routine stop “can in fact 
be quite intrusive”). 
252 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978). 
253 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1037 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (“The 
use of the sense of smell generally is a familiar tool of perception much older than the 
common law or the Bill of Rights.  Indeed, [the Kentucky Supreme Court] stated that 
bloodhound evidence ‘was looked upon with favor as early as the twelfth century . . . .’” 
(internal citation omitted)), aff’d, 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004). 
254 The ancient Romans used war dogs, training Mastiffs to attack the legs of their 
enemies, who would then “lower their shields.”  U.S. War Dogs Ass’n, War Dogs in the 
Marine Corps in World War II, http://www.uswardogs.org/id187.html (last visited May 4, 
2010). 
255 James W. Golden & Jeffery T. Walker, That Dog Will Hunt: Canine-Assisted Search 
and Seizure, in POLICING AND THE LAW 71, 71 (Jeffery T. Walker ed., 2002). 
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populations upon their arrival in America.256  Dogs were used to 
attack Native Americans257 and to chase down runaway slaves.258  
During the Civil War, dogs were used to intimidate and injure 
African-American soldiers fighting for the North.259  Following Pearl 
Harbor, dogs were used to intimidate Japanese Americans residing in 
Hawaii.260 
In more modern times, police dogs have been used for crowd 
control, even on nonviolent civil rights demonstrators.261  The 
passage of time may not have healed these wounds.262  Recent events 
 
256 In 1513, Bartolomé de Las Casas, a missionary and conquistador, described Spanish 
tactics in the conquest for gold and land.  The Conquistadors slaughtered native peoples, 
and even “taught their Hounds, fierce Dogs, to teare [natives] in peeces at the first view.”  
Bartolomé de Las Casas, SPANISH ATROCITIES IN THE WEST INDIES (1513), reprinted in 
EYEWITNESS TO HISTORY 82, 83 (John Carey ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1987) (1987). 
257 As Benjamin Franklin wrote to James Read: 
In Case of meeting a Party of the Enemy, the Dogs are then to be all turn’d loose 
and set on.  They will be fresher and fiercer for having been previously confin’d, 
and will confound the Enemy a good deal, and be very serviceable.  This was the 
Spanish Method. 
Letter from Benjamin Franklin to James Read (Nov. 2, 1755) (on file with the Historical 
Society of Pennsylvania), available at http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framed 
Volumes.jsp?vol=6&page=234a (last visited Nov. 7, 2009); see also J. Robert Lilly & 
Michael B. Puckett, Social Control and Dogs: A Sociohistorical Analysis, 43 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 123, 135 (1997). 
258 See, e.g., Brister v. State, 26 Ala. 107, 118 (1855) (observing that “[t]he defendants 
are slaves . . . [and] were taken into custody by sixteen or seventeen white men, who went 
on the place armed with double-barreled guns, negro whips and sticks, and accompanied 
by a pack of negro dogs, known to be such by defendants”); Benjamin v. Davis, 6 La. 
Ann. 472 (1851).  The court in Benjamin observed that “the defendants came to the house 
of witness early in the morning with their negro dogs, and said they were going to hunt 
runaway negroes.”  Benjamin, 6 La. Ann. at 472.  The overseer “had a right to use the dogs 
in his attempt to make such capture, such means being customary among the planters of 
the parish.”  Id. at 474. 
259 Lilly & Puckett, supra note 257, at 129. 
260 Id. at 130. 
261 See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The 
Events Leading to the Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 
646 (1995) (observing that in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963, television cameras captured 
“black children kneeling in prayer or singing spirituals” who were attacked by “vicious 
police dogs”). 
262 See Carlos Campos, Alpharetta Putting 2 Canine Cops on the Beat, ATLANTA J. 
CONST., Nov. 24, 1994, at G34 (observing that despite the passage of time, “some people 
may associate police-trained German shepherds with the black-and-white news footage of 
vicious dogs cut loose on civil rights activists during the 1960s”).  As a further illustration, 
prior to his confirmation hearings, Justice Thomas described the “bitterness and nostalgia” 
of his childhood in Savannah, Georgia: “I remember being excluded from certain parks, 
stadiums and movie theaters.  I saw the Klan marches, the riots, the police dogs and water 
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have again brought intimidating dogs to the forefront of our national 
consciousness.263  While the German shepherds used at Abu Ghraib 
prison were military trained, the fact remains that our country has an 
unfortunate history of using dogs to target people of color for 
oppression by both military forces and civilian police agencies.  This 
sad legacy cannot be ignored in assessing the intrusiveness of 
introducing a police dog into the curtilage of a private home or using 
a dog for suspicionless screening of multidwelling residential 
complexes. 
3.  Intrusiveness Based on Religious Objections 
Americans love dogs.  It may therefore be hard for the ordinary 
American to fathom that many Muslims view dogs as unclean and 
that contact with dogs, especially canine saliva, is so offensive that it 
necessitates a purification ritual.264  Our increasingly multicultural 
 
hoses.”  Timothy M. Phelps, Nominee a Puzzle: A Look at the Pieces on Eve of Hearings 
on Confirmation, NEWSDAY, Sept. 9, 1991, at 7. 
263 In 2004, photographs emerged that depicted military-trained German shepherds that 
were used to intimidate prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Afghanistan as an interrogation 
strategy.  See Bob Deans & Mike Williams,  ‘Disgust and Disbelief’: Bush Views Prison 
Abuse Photos, ATLANTA J. CONST. May 11, 2004, at 1A (“The Washington Post, which 
last week first published photos of a female U.S. soldier holding a leash attached to the 
neck of a naked Iraqi prisoner, printed a picture in Monday’s editions of a naked detainee 
pinned against cell bars as a pair of guard dogs stood threatening him from both sides.”). 
264 Islamic law, known as Shari’a, is derived primarily from the Qur’an and various 
collections of oral tradition of the Prophet Muhammad documented in the hadith.  See 
generally RICHARD C. MARTIN, ISLAMIC STUDIES: A HISTORY OF RELIGIONS APPROACH 
(2d ed. 1996).  While there are no statements concerning dogs in the Qur’an, numerous 
references to dogs appear in the hadith.  Various of the hadith report that Allah’s 
messenger, the prophet Muhammad, commanded that dogs were to be killed, except for 
those used for hunting and protecting herds and farmland.  See, e.g., SAHIH BUKHARI, Vol. 
4, Book 54, Nos. 531, 539–42; SAHIH MUSLIM, Book 10, Nos. 3814–24.  Due to their 
uncleanliness, the hadith warn that angels will not enter a home where a dog is kept, see, 
e.g., SAHIH BUKHARI, Vol. 4, Book 54, No. 448, that the proximity of a dog to a praying 
person annuls the person’s prayers, see, e.g., SAHIH BUKHARI, Vol. 1, Book 9, No. 490, 
and that keeping a dog as a pet results in a reduction of the keeper’s heavenly rewards, see, 
e.g., SAHIH BUKHARI, Vol. 3, Book 39, No. 516.  For more discussion, see M. Muhsin 
Khan’s translation of Sahih Bukhari at http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/ 
crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/bukhari/, and Abdul Hamid Siddiqui’s 
translation of Sahih Muslim at http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/ 
resources/texts/muslim/hadith/muslim/.  Important to the canine home-sniff issue, an item 
that has become impure due to contact with a dog must be purified by washing the item 
seven times, and then by rubbing it with earth the eighth time.  See, e.g., SAHIH MUSLIM, 
Book 2, No. 0551; Evan Thomas, Into Thin Air, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 3, 2007, at 24 
(observing that American soldiers “continually make cultural blunders, like using canine 
units to search people’s homes [in view of the fact that] dogs are considered unclean in 
Muslim culture”). 
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society requires societal recognition that contact with dogs is 
offensive to many Muslims, however, and perhaps to followers of 
other religions as well.265  In other parts of the world, these objections 
are taken seriously.  In the United Kingdom, for example, guidelines 
are being considered that would require detection dogs to wear 
rubber-soled “bootees” when searching a Muslim’s home or a 
mosque.266  The point of this discussion is not to suggest that special 
rules should apply to any particular group, but rather to illustrate that 
contact with dogs, or contamination from dogs, is highly 
objectionable to some.  Therefore, suspicionless entry of dogs into the 
curtilage of a home, or dragnet use of detection canines, must be 
carefully reconsidered. 
4.  Even Surreptitious Canine Sniffs of the Home Violate the Fourth 
Amendment 
At present, there are few cases that document face-to-face 
encounters between the occupant of a home and a drug-detection 
dog.267  For now, it seems that police officers are trained to avoid 
introducing a drug-detection dog while making initial contact in a 
“knock and talk” encounter, in order to avoid creating a coercive 
atmosphere that would render the occupant’s consent to talk or search 
involuntary.268  In a sense then, law enforcement’s own apparent 
practice of eschewing dogs during the initial stages of a “knock and 
talk” is an implicit acknowledgment that dogs are intimidating and 
offensive and, therefore, intrusive. 
 
265 See, e.g., Sniffer Dogs Unclean, N.Z. HERALD (Mar. 6, 2006) (“Hindu priests 
cleansed a shrine to Indian independence leader Mahatma Gandhi after a visit by 
[President George W.] Bush, the Hindustan Times reported yesterday.  It wasn’t the US 
leader who offended them, but the sniffer-dogs that scoured the area ahead of his visit.”). 
266 See Stuart MacDonald, Sniffer Dogs to Wear ‘Muslim’ Bootees, SUNDAY TIMES 
(London), July 6, 2008, at 1.  The use of such “bootees,” of course, fails to address the 
primary concern to many Muslims, which is the canine’s saliva.  Cf. Richard Peppiatt, It’s 
P.C. Madness; Muslim Raid Dog Bootees, DAILY STAR (U.K.), July 7, 2008, at 25. 
267 Cf. Langley v. State, 735 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that a 
reasonable person would not feel free to leave a “knock-and-talk” encounter when 
confronted by six officers and a “K-9 dog”). 
268 See, e.g., GEORGE S. STEFFEN & SAMUEL M. CANDELARIA, DRUG INTERDICTION: 
PARTNERSHIPS, LEGAL PRINCIPLES, AND INVESTIGATIVE METHODOLOGIES FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 67 (2003) (“The knock and talk team should not take the dog with them to 
the door when making contact with the suspect.  This creates an intimidating and coercive 
environment.  If a drug canine is available, it should be kept out of sight while the consent 
is obtained by the officers.”). 
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On the other hand, drug-detection dogs are often used 
surreptitiously as a means to establish probable cause to obtain a 
search warrant or, on a dragnet basis, to isolate homes or apartments 
for the officers to target for “knock and talks.”  While it could be 
argued that surreptitious use of drug-detection dogs is not 
intimidating or offensive because the home’s occupants are unaware 
that their home has been sniffed, this is, in reality, beside the point.  
First, the home’s occupants may have been aware of the sniff, but 
chose to avoid direct confrontation with the law enforcement team.  
Second, for some such canine contact would likely be offensive on 
religious grounds, regardless of whether it was discovered at the time 
the contact was originally made.269  Third, the potential for 
discovery,270 and therefore intimidation, offense, and even 
embarrassment,271 exists and cannot be predicted in advance.  Fourth, 
unrestricted police discretion allows for arbitrary selection of sniff 
locations; in other words, police targeting of individuals or 
neighborhoods for canine sniff screening without objective antecedent 
justification.272 
As a further thought, there is presently no information about 
property damage to the home of the sort that detection dogs have been 
known to produce in other contexts.273  Property damage of even the 
most de minimis sort has not gone unnoticed by the Court, at least in 
the seizure context.  For example, even such de minimis intrusions as 
the destruction of a minute amount of white powder by the field 
 
269 For discussion of the purification necessary under Islamic law to cleanse an item or 
area that has been contaminated by contact with a dog, see supra note 264. 
270 This “potential for discovery” is distinguishable from the reference to a “potential 
for an invasion of privacy” made by the Karo Court in discussing whether the installation 
of a beeper constituted a seizure.  See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) 
(emphasis omitted).  In Karo, the “potential” privacy invasion was entirely within the 
discretion of the police because the police could decide to turn the beeper on, or not.  Here, 
the intrusiveness that arises either from religious offense or discovery of the canine-sniff 
police unit involves circumstances beyond the officer’s control. 
271 See, e.g., State v. Guillen, 213 P.3d 230, 238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that a 
canine home-sniff violated the Arizona Constitution and describing canine sniffs of the 
exterior of a home as “intimidating, embarrassing, distressing, and worrisome 
encounters”). 
272 See supra note 6. 
273 See Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1549 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that “the dogs 
scratched several cars” at a roadblock set up to detect narcotics); see also United States v. 
Cota-Lopez, 358 F. Supp. 2d 579, 584 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (stating that a drug-detection dog 
alerted “by barking and scratching at the door”). 
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testing in Jacobsen274 or the paint scrapings taken from the exterior of 
the vehicle in Cardwell v. Lewis275 required justification under the 
Court’s reasonableness analysis.276  Important to the Court was the 
fact that the property at issue, the white powder in Jacobsen and the 
automobile in Cardwell, had already been lawfully seized at the time 
these additional de minimis intrusions occurred.277  For canine home-
sniffs, on the other hand, no lawful seizure of the home is required.  
Therefore, even relatively minor property damage to the home may be 
viewed as unreasonable.278  Since it is impossible to know in advance 
whether doors will be scratched, cats will be chased,279 or occupants 
will be frightened or bitten, all canine sniffs of the home should be 
supported by, at a minimum, reasonable suspicion.280 
While the drug-detection dogs presently in service are often of the 
intimidating sort,281 the intrusiveness that arises from a dangerous 
 
274 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984).  The Court observed that, even 
though the amount of tested powder was so minute that its loss was undetectable, id. at 
125 n.27, the field testing “did affect [Jacobsen’s] possessory interests protected by the 
[Fourth] Amendment, since by destroying a quantity of the powder it converted what had 
been only a temporary deprivation of possessory interests into a permanent one.”  Id. at 
124-25. 
275 417 U.S. 583, 591–92 (1974). 
276 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125 (observing that “[t]o assess the reasonableness of [the 
field testing], [we] must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s 
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged 
to justify the intrusion” (internal quotation marks omitted) (third alteration in original)). 
277 See, e.g., id. (observing that “since the property had already been lawfully detained, 
the ‘seizure’ could, at most, have only a de minimis impact on any protected property 
interest”). 
278 Id. at 125 n.28 (cautioning that although the destruction of the white powder in 
Jacobsen was reasonable, “[w]e do not suggest, however, that any seizure of a small 
amount of material is necessarily reasonable”). 
279 While the idea of cats being chased is introduced, in part, to provide a bit of levity to 
the discussion, it should be noted that even inconveniences with respect to property must 
be supported by a lawful initial seizure.  For example, the Jacobsen Court observed that 
the seizure of the luggage in Place became unreasonable because the bags were kept too 
long.  Id. at 124 n.25.  Again, the key point with respect to these additional investigative 
activities (field testing in Jacobsen and the canine sniff in Place) is the fact that both were 
supported by a lawful initial seizure of the item involved.  No such lawful initial seizure of 
a private home is required to conduct a canine home-sniff that would otherwise support 
inconveniences, such as runaway pets or trodden landscaping. 
280 Cf. id. at 125 n.28 (noting that “where more substantial invasions of constitutionally 
protected interests are involved, a warrantless search or seizure is unreasonable in the 
absence of exigent circumstances”). 
281 See supra notes 15, 20–21 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that 
potentially dangerous breeds are generally selected as drug-detection dogs both for an 
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dog’s presence in a home’s curtilage could be mitigated by reliance 
on more “people-friendly” dogs, like the members of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture’s Beagle Brigade.282  Therefore, this 
Article does not propose that reliance on any particular type of drug-
sniffing dog, by itself, justifies treating canine home-sniffs as a 
“search.”283  With that said, it is nevertheless important to emphasize 
that the drug-detection dogs presently in service are intimidating and 
that this fact must not be ignored by courts asked to consider the 
home-sniff question.  When the practice of introducing threatening, 
and potentially offensive, police dogs into the protected curtilage of a 
private home is viewed in conjunction with the heightened 
expectation of privacy associated with the home, then the canine sniff 
issue comes into sharper focus. 
5.  Heightened Expectation of Privacy Associated with the Home 
The conclusion that a canine sniff of the home is a “search” within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment can be traced to United States 
v. Thomas.284  Thomas involved the criminal trial of multiple 
defendants for their operation of a large “narcotics ring run by a 
governing body called the ‘Council.’”285  In Thomas, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the warrantless sniff 
under the apartment door of one of the defendants violated the Fourth 
Amendment: 
[A] practice that is not intrusive in a public airport may be intrusive 
when employed at a person’s home.  Although using a dog sniff for 
narcotics may be discriminating and unoffensive relative to other 
detection methods, and will disclose only the presence or absence of 
narcotics, . . . it remains a way of detecting the contents of a private, 
enclosed space.  With a trained dog police may obtain information 
about what is inside a dwelling that they could not derive from the 
 
“intimidation” factor and because these dogs are often cross-trained for apprehension, or 
“bite,” capabilities). 
282 See supra note 18. 
283 Significantly, however, even people-friendly dogs would remain offensive to those 
who objected to dogs on religious grounds.  See supra notes 264-66 and accompanying 
text.  Further, dogs may produce property damage, like scratched doors or other 
inconveniences. 
284 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985). 
285 Id. at 1362.  The story of this vast and highly organized drug operation is depicted in 
“American Gangster,” a movie starring Denzel Washington as drug kingpin Frank Lucas 
and Cuba Gooding, Jr., as Leroy “Nicky” Barnes.  AMERICAN GANGSTER (Universal 
Studios 2007).  Barnes is described as a “co-conspirator” to the defendants in the Thomas 
opinion.  See Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1362. 
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use of their own senses.  Consequently, the officers’ use of a dog is 
not a mere improvement of their sense of smell, as ordinary 
eyeglasses improve vision, but is a significant enhancement 
accomplished by a different, and far superior, sensory instrument.  
Here the defendant had a legitimate expectation that the contents of 
his closed apartment would remain private, that they could not be 
“sensed” from outside his door.  Use of the trained dog 
impermissibly intruded on that legitimate expectation.286 
The Second Circuit’s conclusions on this issue were viewed as 
unsound, however, and have been rejected by all federal circuits and 
district courts that have considered the canine home-sniff issue.287  
Only one court has followed Thomas’s privacy-based analysis and 
found that a canine home-sniff is a “search” under the Federal 
Constitution.288  The State v. Rabb court, in reliance on Thomas and 
Kyllo’s concerns about protecting the privacy of the home from 
government intrusions, explained: 
Likewise, it is of no importance that a dog sniff provides limited 
information regarding only the presence or absence of contraband, 
because as in Kyllo, the quality or quantity of information obtained 
through the search is not the feared injury.  Rather, it is the fact that 
law enforcement endeavored to obtain the information from inside 
the house at all, or in this case, the fact that a dog’s sense of smell 
crossed the “firm line” of Fourth Amendment protections at the 
door of [the] house.289 
While federal courts, other than the Second Circuit, have refused to 
extend Fourth Amendment protection to canine home-sniffs, a 
number of states have interpreted their own constitutions to provide 
 
286 Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1366–67 (citation omitted). 
287 See supra note 7 (listing courts that found a canine home-sniff is not a “search” 
under the Federal Constitution); see also Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1031 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2003) (observing that Thomas had met with “universal disapprobation”), aff’d, 
864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004).  The Second Circuit recently distinguished Thomas, but did 
not reject it or signal that it would reject Thomas if given the opportunity on appropriate 
facts.  See United States v. Hayes, 551 F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding Thomas 
“clearly distinguishable” because the detection dog sniffed a brushy area approximately 
sixty-five feet from the back door of the residence, not inside the home itself). 
288 See generally  State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 
549 U.S. 1052 (2006).  One district court clearly accepted Thomas’s reasoning, but its 
holding appears distinguishable because the canine sniff at issue was performed at the 
back door of the private home, a location that the court concluded was not a “public 
place.”  See United States v. Jackson, No. IP 03-79-CR-1H/F, 2004 WL 1784756, at *4 
(S.D. Ind. Feb. 2, 2004). 
289 Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1184. 
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protection under a variety of canine sniff circumstances.290  Although 
not determinative of the Fourth Amendment search issue,291 these 
cases are strong evidence that states routinely consider the 
circumstances of a canine sniff, and when privacy concerns are 
implicated, states provide protection.  In a sense, the sheer number of 
states that consider the circumstances of a canine sniff in determining 
whether it is a “search” suggests that “time has set its face against” a 
categorical rule that sniffs are per se nonsearches.292  Further, these 
states’ practice is evidence that the canine sniff technique can be 
viewed as a “search” when used in privacy-sensitive circumstances 
without burdensome disruption of police investigative efforts.  In 
view of the heightened expectation of privacy associated with the 
home and the intrusiveness of bringing a drug-detection dog into the 
protected curtilage area of a private residence, it is appropriate to 
characterize a canine home-sniff as a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
290 See McGahan v. State, 807 P.2d 506, 509–11 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (finding that a 
canine sniff of the exterior of a warehouse was a “search” under the Alaska Constitution); 
State v. Guillen, 213 P.3d 230, 239 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that a canine sniff of the 
exterior of a home violated the Arizona Constitution); People v. Haley, 41 P.3d 666, 672 
(Colo. 2001) (finding that canine sniffs are “searches” requiring reasonable suspicion 
under the Colorado Constitution); Hoop v. State, 909 N.E.2d 463, 470 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2009) (finding that a canine sniff of a front door of a residence required reasonable 
suspicion under the Indiana Constitution); State v. Baumann, 759 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2009) (finding that a canine sniff of a common hallway of an apartment building 
was a “search” under the Minnesota Constitution, which must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion); State v. Tackitt, 67 P.3d 295, 302–03 (Mont. 2003) (requiring “particularized 
suspicion” under the Montana Constitution); State v. Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d 805, 811 (Neb. 
1999) (finding a legitimate expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment and the 
Nebraska Constitution, which required “reasonable, articulable suspicion” to conduct a  
canine sniff, although the Nebraska Supreme Court never expressly stated that a canine 
sniff of the threshold of the apartment was a “search”); State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 
716–17 (N.H. 1990) (finding that a canine sniff of a vehicle was a “search” requiring 
reasonable suspicion under the New Hampshire Constitution); People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 
1054, 1058 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that a sniff outside an apartment door was a “search” 
under the New York Constitution); State v. Woljevach, 828 N.E.2d 1015, 1018 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2005) (finding that a canine sniff was a “search” under the Ohio Constitution); 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556, 560 (Pa. 1993) (finding that a canine sniff of a 
person was a “search” under the Pennsylvania Constitution requiring probable cause); 
State v. Dearman, 962 P.2d 850, 854 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that a canine sniff of 
a garage was a “search” under the Washington Constitution). 
291 Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652–53, 660 (1961) (discussing the states’ decision 
to adopt the exclusionary rule despite the fact that the Court had not required them to do so 
and observing that “the experience of the states is impressive . . . [and] [t]he movement 
towards the rule of exclusion has been halting but seemingly inexorable”). 
292 Cf. id. at 653 (discussing, among other things, the states’ voluntary movement 
toward adopting the exclusionary rule). 
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6.  Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause? 
If the Court were to conclude that a canine home-sniff is, in fact, a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment, as this Article proposes, the 
essential remaining question would be what quantum of suspicion is 
required to support the practice: reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause?293  Certainly, the suspicion standard is an issue over which 
reasonable minds could disagree.  New York, Arizona, and Indiana, 
for example, have concluded that a canine home-sniff is a “search” 
under their state constitutions but that reasonable suspicion is 
sufficient to support the sniff-search.294  On the other hand, 
Washington and Ohio have interpreted their state constitutions to 
require a search warrant supported by probable cause.295  The Rabb 
court also found the canine home-sniff to be a search but based its 
conclusion on the Fourth Amendment, which Rabb also interpreted to 
require a warrant supported by probable cause.296  In view of the 
divergent approaches on the suspicion standard, a few observations 
seem appropriate. 
Absent exigent circumstances, a warrant is required to search a 
person’s home or person.297  While the Court has refused to allow 
increased law enforcement efficiency to serve as a basis for bypassing 
 
293 As the New York Court of Appeals observed, “[o]ur conclusion that there was a 
search, however, does not end the inquiry.”  Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1058. 
294 Id. (deciding that a canine sniff “may be used without a warrant or probable cause, 
provided that the police have a reasonable suspicion that a residence contains . . . 
contraband”); Guillen, 213 P.3d at 239 (finding that a canine sniff of the “seams of a 
residence” was a “search” under the Arizona Constitution, which must be supported by 
reasonable suspicion); Hoop, 909 N.E.2d at 470 (finding that a canine sniff of the front 
door of a residence required reasonable suspicion under the Indiana Constitution); see also 
Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d at 811 (requiring “reasonable, articulable suspicion” to conduct a 
canine sniff without expressly finding that the canine sniff of the threshold of the 
apartment was a “search”). 
295 Dearman, 962 P.2d 850, 854 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that a canine sniff 
of a garage was a “search” under the Washington Constitution and that a search warrant 
based upon probable cause was required); Woljevach, 828 N.E.2d 1015, 1018 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2005) (interpreting the Ohio Constitution to require same); cf. Martin, 626 A.2d 556, 
560 (Pa. 1993) (concluding that a canine sniff of a person was a “search” under the 
Pennsylvania Constitution, which required a showing of probable cause). 
296 State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1192 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 
1052 (2006).  In fact, Florida’s district courts of appeal are presently split on the home-
sniff issue, with the Fourth District Court of Appeal finding a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment and the Third District Court of Appeal finding that it was not a search.  
Compare Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, with State v. Jardines, 9 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App.), review granted, 3 So. 3d 1246 (Fla. 2009). 
297 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). 
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the warrant requirement,298 the Court does consider the real-world 
pressures of law enforcement when police are asked to make split-
second decisions involving unfolding events in the field.299  In most 
cases involving canine home-sniffs, however, the police decision to 
perform the sniff does not involve the sort of split-second calculation 
that was present in Terry.  Similar to the use of a thermal imager, in 
most cases there is time for police to resort to the warrant process.300  
Some courts faced with the home-sniff question have suggested that 
probable cause would be an illogical requirement because a showing 
of probable cause would allow officers to obtain a search warrant to 
conduct a physical search of the premises in any event.301  While this 
argument may seem intuitively plausible, it is incorrect.  In fact, the 
same argument could be made for the thermal-imaging device at issue 
in Kyllo: if police have probable cause to perform a thermal scan on a 
private home, then, the argument goes, police would also have 
probable cause to physically search the home for contraband, thereby 
rendering the need for the thermal scan irrelevant.  The years since 
Kyllo have disproved this argument, however.  The focus of post-
Kyllo thermal-imaging warrant applications has been on whether there 
is probable cause to conduct the scan, not on whether there is 
probable cause to physically search the premises.302 
 
298 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (“The investigation of crime would 
always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary.  But the Fourth Amendment reflects 
the view of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person’s home and 
property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement 
of the criminal law.”). 
299 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (observing that “we deal here with an entire 
rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot 
observations of the officer on the beat—which historically has not been, and as a practical 
matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure”). 
300 See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 402 (2006) (discussing warrantless entry 
by law enforcement in an emergency). 
301 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1039 n.6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (“A 
requirement for either a probable-cause-based warrant or even probable cause without a 
warrant as justification for a dog sniff would be an exercise in redundancy.  The probable 
cause to conduct a dog sniff would ipso facto make the dog sniff unnecessary.  The 
probable cause would in and of itself justify the issuance of the search warrant and the dog 
sniff would be superfluous.”), aff’d, 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004). 
302 See, e.g., United States v. Kattaria, 553 F.3d 1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding 
probable cause to issue a thermal-imaging warrant, therefore the results of the thermal 
scan were properly used to obtain a warrant to physically search the premises); United 
States v. Henry, 538 F.3d 300, 301 (4th Cir. 2008) (observing that police first obtained a 
search warrant to perform a thermal scan, then used the results of the thermal scan as well 
as other information to obtain a “conventional search warrant” to physically search the 
property). 
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Similar to the thermal-imaging warrants required after Kyllo, a 
canine sniff of a private home should be supported by a warrant 
issued on the basis of probable cause to perform the sniff, not 
probable cause to physically search the premises.  The requirement of 
a dog-sniff warrant would thereby ensure that canine sniffs of private 
residences would be limited to circumstances in which police had 
conducted an investigation and established an objectively reasonable 
basis for performing the sniff—to the satisfaction of a neutral and 
detached magistrate.  Examination of the facts by a magistrate would 
provide the steadying balance that is essential to ensure that canine 
sniffs of the home are conducted only under appropriate 
circumstances.303 
C.  Are There Limitations in Kyllo that Argue Against Its 
Applicability to the Canine Home-Sniff Issue? 
tech•nol•o•gy . . . 1a: the practical application of knowledge esp. in 
a particular area . . . b: a capability given by the practical 
application of knowledge <a car’s fuel-saving ~>  2: a manner of 
accomplishing a task esp. using technical processes, methods, or 
knowledge . . . 3: the specialized aspects of a particular field of 
endeavor[.]304 
As the Kyllo oral argument reflects, the Court clearly anticipates 
the eventual intersection of the canine home-sniff question and 
Kyllo’s limitations on sense-enhancing technology directed at the 
home.305  Kyllo’s relevancy to this question may turn on whether a 
detection dog is sense-enhancing “technology” and, if so, whether 
that technology could be considered “advancing” technology, to 
which Kyllo would apparently be applicable, or instead “routine” 
technology, to which Kyllo would apparently be inapplicable. 
 
303 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous 
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence.  Its protection consists in requiring 
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of 
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime. 
Id. at 13–14. 
304 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1283 (11th ed. 2007). 
305 Transcript of Oral Argument at 19–20, 22, 33, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 
(2001) (No. 99-8508), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/99-8508.pdf. 
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1.  Dogs as Natural Technology 
Dogs are familiar fixtures in American society.  Many of us have 
one sleeping on our sofa, guilt-free, at any given time.  It is important 
not to allow our fondness for personal pets color the legal analysis of 
whether a trained detection dog, when used to discover information 
about the interior of a home, should be viewed as “technology” for 
purposes of Kyllo.306  Lower courts that refuse to apply Kyllo to 
canine home-sniffs do so, in part, based on our overall familiarity 
with dogs and their superior sense of smell307 and, as they argue, 
because the canine sense of smell is not a “rapidly advancing 
technology” of the sort warned about in Kyllo.308 
Interestingly enough, the White House’s Office of National Drug 
Control Policy discusses detection dogs and lists them as “Non-
Intrusive Technology,”309 and as is discussed below, the government 
describes detection dogs as “technology” in other project materials as 
well.  Therefore, the government may find itself in the uncomfortable 
position of both defining and treating drug-detection dogs as 
“technology” in its own project literature and also arguing to courts 
that such dogs are not sense-enhancing “technology” for purposes of 
criminal suppression hearings.  Understanding why the government 
treats drug-detection dogs as technology is therefore essential in 
determining whether these dogs are “advancing technology” for Kyllo 
purposes. 
As a threshold matter, it is helpful to consider more thoroughly the 
government’s treatment of drug-detection dogs in its own project 
literature.  For example, a program is presently in place that is 
intended to enhance the drug-detection dog gene pool. In its 
“Nonintrusive Inspection” discussion, the White House’s Office of 
National Drug Control Policy described the program’s intended goal 
of creating a “worldwide gene pool” for substance-detection canines: 
 
306 But cf. Fitzgerald v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1015 (Md. 2004) (“[A] dog is not 
technology—he or she is a dog.  A dog is known commonly as ‘man’s best friend.’  
Across America, people consider dogs as members of their family.”). 
307 See supra note 253. 
308 See Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1037 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (observing 
that “[t]he investigative use of the animal sense of smell, human or canine, cannot even be 
defined as a technology.  It is, a fortiori, not an unfamiliar or rapidly advancing 
technology that ‘is not in general use.’”), aff’d, 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004); see also State 
v. Bergmann, 633 N.W.2d 328, 334 (Iowa 2001) (observing that, in a vehicle-sniff 
context, “a drug sniffing dog is not technology of the type addressed in Kyllo”). 
309 See infra notes 310–11 and accompanying text. 
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In conjunction with the U.S. Customs Service, the graduates of a 
breeding strategy for substance detecting canines are now working 
at U.S. ports of entry.  Based on quantitative genetic principles 
proven by the Australian Customs Service, initial results indicate 
the potential to establish a worldwide gene pool for substance 
detection canines. . . . Scientists at Auburn University are analyzing 
functional olfaction characteristics to improve our understanding of 
the biological and behavioral processes in substance detection with 
canines.  A dynamic three-dimensional model has been constructed 
of the olfactory laminar flow, recovery, and adaptation.  Further 
study will verify the mechanisms of the particle filtration process.  
Findings are being disseminated to all substance detection canine 
training agencies.310 
Additionally, the 2002 Counterdrug Research and Development 
Blueprint Update (Blueprint) includes “substance detection canines” 
in the “Technology” section of its brief.  Even the placement of the 
detection-dog technology discussion in the Blueprint is revealing.  
There, the discussion of the “worldwide gene pool” is flanked by a 
neutron-based probe that can be used to “provide a characterization of 
the [searched and] imaged object based on its elemental 
composition,” and a handheld device that can be used “to identify 
drugs in solid mixtures (e.g., pills) and aqueous solutions” through a 
“near infrared Raman spectroscopy method.”311 
While a drug-detection dog is obviously not a gadget, these dogs 
are the object of meaningful scientific study and development; study 
both for the purpose of improved training and to scientifically 
enhance the dog’s capabilities.  The canine sniff technique is being 
 
310 THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: COUNTERDRUG 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BLUEPRINT UPDATE, at C-1 (2002) [hereinafter 
COUNTERDRUG RESEARCH], available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/ctac/ 
ctac02/blueprint2002.pdf. 
 Genetics research is also being conducted by the U.S. Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) to enhance the capabilities of explosives-detection dogs.  See Zack 
Phillips, The Sniff Test, GOV’T EXECUTIVE, Dec. 1, 2006 (quoting Scott Thomas, breeder 
for TSA program), http://www.govexec.com/features/1206-01/1206-01s2.htm (“‘We’ll be 
custom-designing dogs for purposes of detection . . . . We call them Labrador retrievers; 
there may come a day we call them Labrador detectors.’”).  The TSA breeding program 
has produced “a new custom breed,” the Vinzslador, in the hope of producing detection 
dogs with the best qualities of both Labrador retrievers and vizslas.  Id.  (“‘Let’s not think 
of a dog as an old tool that can’t be improved on . . . . It can, with current technology.’”). 
311 COUNTERDRUG RESEARCH, supra note 310, at 6 & app. at C-1.  Appendix C 
classifies canines as a “nonintrusive inspection technolog[y],” see id. app. at C-1, while 
Appendix D includes the canine breeding program as a type of “narcotics detection 
technolog[y].”  See id. app. at D-1, D-3. 
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enhanced (and, therefore, advanced) through scientific research,312 
breeding programs,313 scientifically validated training programs,314 
and cloning technology.315  Just because a dog is not a gadget is not 
determinative of whether detection dogs have been trained and 
developed such that they represent a form of sense-enhancing 
technology.  As the definition of “technology” suggests, the term 
describes “practical application of knowledge especially in a 
particular area.”  Because detection dogs receive careful training 
using “technical processes, methods, or knowledge,”316 and are the 
subject of scientific study that is intended to enhance their 
capabilities,317 these dogs satisfy the definition of “technology.”  
Certainly, the government’s own treatment of drug-detection dogs is a 
clear indication that, true to the label the government has attached to 
them, these specially trained canines are a form of technology, and 
 
312 Russia, for example, has created a new breed of “super sniffer” dogs by 
crossbreeding Siberian huskies with jackals.  See Ben Aris, Russians Breed Superdog with 
a Jackal’s Nose for Bombs and Drugs, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, Dec. 15, 2002, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/1416227/Russians-breed-
superdog-with-a-jackals-nose-for-bombs-and-drugs.html.  The “super sniffer dog” has an 
“enhanced sense of smell” and was the product of a scientific research project that lasted 
twenty-seven years.  Id. 
313 See supra note 310 and accompanying text. 
314 For example, in the civil forfeiture context, concerns about currency contamination 
have led some courts to require a “sophisticated dog alert” on money that the government 
seeks to seize because of its connection to drug trafficking.  See Sumareh v. Doe (In re 
$80,045.00 in U.S. Currency), 161 F. App’x 670, 671 (9th Cir. 2006); see also supra note 
40. 
315 See supra note 310 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of a “worldwide 
gene pool” for substance-detection canines).  Additionally, South Korea has used cloning 
technology to create “the world’s first cloned drug-sniffing dogs.”  South Korea to Use 
Cloned Sniffer Dogs, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 24, 2008, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24296334/ (“‘We came up with the idea of dog cloning 
after thinking about how we can possess a superior breed at a cheaper cost.’” (quoting Hur 
Yong-suk, head of the Korean Customs Service)).  These cloned dogs are touted as 
possessing superior drug-detection capabilities.  See Clone Ranger Sniffs Out Airport 
Drugs, PHYSORG.COM, Aug. 12, 2009, http://www.physorg.com/news169283100.html 
(stating that the cloned drug detector’s “achievement [in locating three grams of narcotics 
in a tightly zipped bag] shows cloned dogs are much better than ordinary dogs at detecting 
narcotics”). 
316 See supra note 304. 
317 See, e.g., Waggoner et al., supra note 37, at 216 (observing that “[t]he following 
laboratory study of dogs’ detection of cocaine hydrochloride and its degradation product 
methyl benzoate were conducted as part of the ongoing efforts of Auburn University’s 
Institute for Biological Detection Systems to enhance canine detection technology” 
(emphasis added)); see also supra note 315 (discussing the development of a “super 
sniffer” dog). 
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that substantial scientific attention has been directed toward 
“advancing” this technology. 
Additionally, from a practical perspective, it makes sense to treat a 
canine home-sniff as “technology,” and therefore subject to Kyllo.  If 
dogs are permitted to sniff homes for drug-detection purposes, there 
would be no principled way to distinguish between canines and 
mechanical devices that revealed only the presence or absence of 
controlled or other illegal substances.318  The only distinguishing 
differences between these two varieties of “sniffers” would be that a 
dog is animate and perhaps less accurate than any mechanical sniffer 
that might ultimately be used in the field.319  While some might argue 
that the lack of precise accuracy of the canine sniff, as compared to a 
mechanical sniffer, makes the canine sniff less intrusive, this 
argument makes little sense in the home-sniff context because the 
ensuing search on the basis of a false-positive alert would be so 
extraordinarily intrusive.320  Furthermore, basing any distinction on 
Kyllo’s expressed concerns about “advancing technology” seems 
premature in the canine sniff context because genetics-based breeding 
programs with the intended goal of enhancing drug-detection dog 
capabilities are in place,321 and a so-called “super sniffer” dog has 
 
318 Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 47–48 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Kyllo majority’s analysis would apparently be applicable to “mechanical 
substitutes” for detection dogs, even if the device was similarly limited to the type of 
information revealed by a canine sniff—“illegal activity”—and that therefore the 
majority’s opinion would necessarily bar the use of such devices). 
319 The Georgia Institute of Technology has developed a mechanical sniffer, which has 
been referred to as an electronic “dog-on-a-chip.”  The vapor sensor, also known as an 
“electronic nose,” is said to be more sensitive than a drug-detection dog; dogs can detect 
molecules in the part-per-billion range, while the dog-on-a-chip at “a few trillionths of a 
gram.”  Press Release, Ga. Inst. of Tech., “Dog-on-a-Chip” Could Replace Drug-Sniffing 
Canines (Nov. 7, 2003) (reporting results from D.D. Stubbs et al., Investigation of Cocaine 
Plumes Using Surface Acoustic Wave Immunoassay Sensors, 75 ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY 
6231 (2003)); see also Paige Bowers, How to Put a Police Dog on a Chip, TIME, Jan. 4, 
2004, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,570268,00.html.  
As discussed in Part I, canine detectors have a natural advantage over electronic detectors 
based on the dog’s mobility and agility, which allows the dog to get close to the suspected 
contraband source.  See supra note 46 and accompanying text.  The canine’s natural ability 
to get close to the scent source was not a consideration in this scientific research, however.  
The need for proximity to the suspected contraband source for detection purposes, while 
obviously desirable, remains unstudied in the canine home-sniff context. 
320 See supra notes 208–18 and accompanying text (discussing the intrusiveness of a 
search of the home both because of the size of the home in comparison to other containers 
and because police would be permitted to examine any container or location capable of 
secreting drugs). 
321 See supra notes 310, 312, 315. 
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been produced by crossbreeding Siberian huskies with jackals.322  
Therefore, the only remaining distinction is that dogs are animate 
sensing devices and mechanical sniffers are not.  While this is 
admittedly a way to distinguish the two varieties of “sniffers,” the 
distinction appears to be the only way to distinguish them in a 
principled manner.  As the Rabb court observed: 
At the end of the analysis, the Fourth Amendment remains 
decidedly about “place,” and when the place at issue is a home, a 
firm line remains at its entrance blocking the noses of dogs from 
sniffing government’s way into the intimate details of an 
individual’s life.  If that line should crumble, one can only fear 
where future lines will be drawn and where sniffing dogs, or even 
more intrusive and disturbing sensory-enhancing methods, will be 
seen next.323 
Accordingly, drug-detection dogs represent a “natural” 
technological aid to law enforcement and should therefore be subject 
to Kyllo.324  Similar to the thermal imager in Kyllo, detection dogs do 
not actually detect contraband in most cases; their alert to the methyl 
benzoate molecule instead allows police to infer that contraband is 
also present.  Therefore, drug-detection dogs are a sense-enhancing 
technology that implicate the same concerns expressed in Kyllo: (1) 
“advancing technology,” in view of the potential for technology-
based enhancement of the canine sniff technique (through science-
based breeding programs, cloning technology, and innovative training 
tactics), and (2) the disclosure of noncontraband information. 
2.  “Routineness” of Technology Directed at the Home 
As Kyllo clearly indicated, not all sense-enhancing technology is 
barred from use in gathering information about the interior of the 
home.  The Kyllo Court specified that whether technology was in 
“general public use,” which Kyllo explained to mean “routine,” may 
be a factor in determining whether the police surveillance tactic at 
 
322 See supra note 312. 
323 State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1192 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 
1052 (2006). 
324 While the Kyllo Court also referenced “hi-tech measurement of emanations from a 
house,” the opinion does not suggest that this comment was intended to exclude from 
Kyllo’s reach natural technological aids that implicate Kyllo’s concerns about advancing 
technologies in general.  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 n.4 (2001) 
(responding to the dissent’s argument that the thermal imager at issue simply allowed 
police to infer what was going on inside Kyllo’s house). 
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issue amounts to a “search.”325  Therefore, it is worthwhile to 
consider whether dogs could be viewed as sufficiently “routine” to 
merit treatment as technology that is in “general public use.”  In other 
words, even if dogs are viewed as sense-enhancing technology within 
the meaning of Kyllo, the canine sniff might be sufficiently “routine” 
that society would lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
information revealed by the sniff. 
While the Kyllo Court did not specify how “routineness” was to be 
determined,326 guidance on this issue can be found in Kyllo’s 
treatment of earlier cases in which technology was used to gain 
information about the home or its uncovered curtilage areas.  Kyllo 
expressly endorsed earlier Supreme Court decisions that permitted the 
use of technology to facilitate the ordinary perceptions of police 
officers.327  In the aerial surveillance cases, Florida v. Riley328 and 
California v. Ciraolo,329 the technology of air flight enabled the 
officers to observe marijuana plants growing in uncovered curtilage 
areas of private residences.  Neither case involved optical 
magnification of a human’s ordinary eyesight, however.  The Riley 
and Ciraolo cases focused on the lawfulness of air flight at the 
elevations involved and the fact that no intimate details concerning 
the home were discovered during the aerial surveillance.330  Although 
Kyllo clearly accepted the validity of the Riley and Ciraolo 
 
325 Id. at 39 n.6. 
326 In fact, Justice Stevens, in his Kyllo dissent, protested the majority’s failure both to 
analyze the “general public use” factor and to remand for an evidentiary hearing on this 
issue.  See id. at 47 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that there are thousands of 
thermal imagers presently in use and that they are “readily available to the public”). 
327 See id. at 33.  The majority noted that the Court had concluded on two different 
occasions that aerial surveillance of private homes and their surrounding areas was not a 
“search.”  See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 
U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986) (majority opinion). 
328 Riley, 488 U.S. at 448 (observing that “[w]ith his naked eye, [the officer] was able to 
see through the openings in the roof . . . to identify what he thought was marijuana 
growing in the structure”). 
329 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 (observing that “[t]he Fourth Amendment simply does not 
require the police traveling in the public airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in 
order to observe what is visible to the naked eye”). 
330 Riley, 488 U.S. at 451 (observing that “it is of obvious importance that the helicopter 
in this case was not violating the law”); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (noting that “[t]he 
observations by [the officers] in this case took place within public navigable airspace”).  
Also important to the Riley Court was the fact that “no intimate details” about the home or 
curtilage were observed and the fact that “there was no undue noise . . . and no wind, dust, 
or threat of injury.”  Riley, 488 U.S. at 452. 
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decisions,331 it reoriented their justification to make those decisions 
consistent with Kyllo’s reasoning.  The Kyllo Court deemphasized the 
earlier decisions’ reliance on the nonintimacy of the information 
discovered and instead focused on the routineness of the air flight 
technology that made the naked-eye observations possible.332 
After Kyllo, all “details” concerning the home are private, 
regardless of the intimacy of that information.333  Significantly, 
however, while intending protectiveness, Kyllo may have injected a 
more damaging categorization issue into the technology discussion.  
By characterizing air flight as “routine” and therefore available for 
gathering information about the home, Kyllo completely severed the 
technology, in a definitional sense, from the context in which it was 
used.  As Justice O’Connor pointed out in her Riley concurrence, the 
circumstances under which technology is used should determine 
whether expectations of privacy are reasonable.334 
After Riley, the Court seemed to embrace Justice O’Connor’s more 
situation-sensitive analysis in Bond v. United States.335  Bond is a pre-
Kyllo decision that considered the reasonable societal expectations of 
bus passengers concerning how their luggage would be manipulated 
by other passengers on a bus.  Rather than follow a more categorical 
 
331 Kyllo cites these cases favorably, in part, because of our long history of permitting 
nontrespassory visual surveillance.  See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31–33 (observing that “[v]isual 
surveillance was unquestionably lawful because ‘the eye cannot by the laws of England be 
guilty of a trespass’” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (quoting Entick 
v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (K.B. 1765)))). 
332 Id. at 38 n.5 (“We think the [Ciraolo] Court’s focus in this second-hand dictum 
[from the California Supreme Court] was not upon intimacy but upon otherwise-
imperceptibility, which is precisely the principle we vindicate today.”).  The majority 
explained that limiting “searches” to those that revealed only intimate details “would not 
only be wrong in principle; it would be impractical in application.”  Id. at 38. 
333 Id. at 40 (observing that “[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device that is not 
in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been 
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively 
unreasonable without a warrant”). 
334 See Riley, 488 U.S. at 455 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the 
plurality’s focus on the fact that the helicopter remained within navigable air space and, 
alternatively, arguing that “we must ask whether the helicopter was in the public airways 
at an altitude at which members of the public travel with sufficient regularity that Riley’s 
expectation of privacy from aerial observation was not one that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
335 See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000) (finding that an officer’s 
probing palpation of Bond’s soft-side luggage located in a bus’s overhead bin violated the 
Fourth Amendment). 
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approach, like the one used by the Riley plurality,336 the Bond Court 
instead found that the Fourth Amendment had been violated based on 
a context-sensitive analysis: while any passenger could have squeezed 
Bond’s luggage in attempting to place their own luggage in the 
overhead bin, the Court concluded that passengers do not reasonably 
anticipate that other passengers will manipulate their luggage in the 
probing manner used by the officer.337  The Kyllo Court’s shorthand 
reference to air flight as “routine” without any reference to the context 
of the air flight suggests that “routineness” may be analyzed under the 
categorical approach of the Riley plurality, rather than the context-
sensitive approach articulated in Bond.  If this is the case, then once a 
given technology is deemed to be “routine,” courts might no longer 
consider the way in which the technology was used. 
For canine home-sniffs, Kyllo’s apparent blueprint for analyzing 
“routineness” creates risks beyond the obvious ones338: where a 
category of excluded surveillance tactics (i.e., one excluded from 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny because it is “routine”) collides with 
another category of excluded surveillance tactics (i.e., a canine sniff), 
the risk of unreasonably narrowing Katz’s privacy-based Fourth 
Amendment analysis becomes real.  In allowing canine sniffs of the 
home, lower courts have emphasized our overall familiarity with dogs 
and our societal recognition that dogs have an excellent sense of smell 
that has long benefited law enforcement.339  In other words, dogs are 
“routine,” which sets the stage for the conclusion that, even if 
 
336 If the Riley plurality approach had been applied, then police would have been 
permitted to conduct a probing palpation because any passenger could have probed Bond’s 
luggage while placing a bag in the overhead bin. 
337 See Bond, 529 U.S. at 338–39 (observing that while “a bus passenger clearly expects 
that his bag may be handled . . . [h]e does not expect that other passengers or bus 
employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner”). 
338 The obvious hazard that Kyllo’s exception for routine technology creates was 
described by Justice Stevens in his dissent: “[P]utting aside its lack of clarity, this criterion 
is somewhat perverse because it seems likely that the threat to privacy will grow, rather 
than recede, as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily available.”  Kyllo, 
533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
339 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1037 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003), aff’d, 
864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004).  As the Maryland Court of Special Appeals observed in 
Fitzgerald: 
 The investigative use of the animal sense of smell, human or canine, cannot 
even be defined as a technology.  It is, a fortiori, not an unfamiliar or rapidly 
advancing technology that “is not in general use.”  Bloodhounds have been 
chasing escaping prisoners and other fugitives through the swamps for hundreds 
of years . . . . 
Id.  
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detection dogs are viewed as “technology” for Kyllo purposes, they 
should be viewed as routine technology. 
The convergence between two categorical exclusions from Katz’s 
privacy analysis simply goes too far.  After Place and Caballes, 
unless the context of the canine sniff (here, the home) is viewed as 
being too intrusive for Fourth Amendment purposes, the validity of 
the warrantless canine sniff must be upheld.  If routineness is also a 
factor (assuming for now, as some lower courts have, that a detection 
dog could be viewed as “routine”), then no meaningful examination 
of the context of the sniff would be available even under Kyllo.  Such 
a model makes no sense.  Even assuming the ongoing vitality of the 
canine sniff doctrine, adding another layer of insulation from review 
in the form of “routineness” would render judicial evaluation of 
canine sniffs of the home unreachable.340 
In addition to the “routineness” factor for Kyllo’s applicability, 
Riley and Ciraolo are important for another reason.  In fact, these 
cases are important for what they do not say.  Riley and Ciraolo 
turned on society’s acceptance of modern air travel and the 
assumption that items may be viewable by air travelers when looking 
out airplane windows.  The Court in both cases noted, and perhaps 
even emphasized, that the observations had been made with the naked 
eye.341  To be clear, the issue of optical magnification was not before 
the Court in either Riley or Ciraolo, only the warrantless use of 
technology (air flight) to gain a better vantage point.342  The Riley and 
Ciraolo Courts’ analysis was based on a generalized lack of privacy 
in observations made during the course of air travel, not on the more 
specific assertion that individuals lack an expectation of privacy in 
contraband—even when that contraband is located in their homes or 
uncovered curtilage areas.  Significantly, however, if the more 
specific assertion, the Jacobsen premise, controlled the legal question, 
then the fact that the observations in Riley and Ciraolo were made 
with the naked eye would have been irrelevant.  If Jacobsen 
 
340 Cf. Peebles, supra note 152, at 86 (“[F]ailure to reach the question of reasonableness 
of a search has meant that many types of governmental intrusions are taken out of the 
domain of judicial control altogether.  To hold that no reasonable expectation of privacy 
existed and that no search occurred permits the judiciary, in effect, to wash its hands of its 
normal supervisory role over a given type of governmental investigative activity.”). 
341 See supra notes 328–29. 
342 However, the lack of optical magnification was an important fact, even to the Kyllo 
Court.  See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 (observing that, unlike Riley and Ciraolo, “[t]he present 
case involves officers on a public street engaged in more than naked-eye surveillance of a 
home”). 
 902 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 829 
controlled, use of optical magnification would be permissible since 
the observations would not be physically intrusive and society has 
come to accept that the vantage point for the observation (air flight) is 
routine.  The Riley and Ciraolo Courts did not so much as hint that 
the use of optics would have been permissible, however.  Instructive 
to the canine home-sniff question is the fact that nowhere in Riley and 
Ciraolo does the Court rely on the Jacobsen premise. 
IV 
THE PATH AHEAD 
[W]e cannot forgive the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in 
the name of law enforcement.  This is no formality that we require 
today but a fundamental rule that has long been recognized in . . . 
America.  While “[t]he requirements of the Fourth Amendment are 
not inflexible, or obtusely unyielding to the legitimate needs of law 
enforcement,” . . . it is not asking too much that officers be required 
to comply with the basic command of the Fourth Amendment 
before the innermost secrets of one’s home or office are invaded.343 
It is reasonable and appropriate to consider the context in which a 
police investigative tool is used to determine whether it is a “search” 
for Fourth Amendment purposes.  Canine sniffs are not per se beyond 
the reach of the Fourth Amendment when the sniff is performed under 
intrusive circumstances or in a location that implicates stringent 
Fourth Amendment privacy concerns.  A canine sniff of the home is 
problematic both because of its intrusiveness and because it 
implicates the privacy concerns expressed in Kyllo.  Therefore, a 
canine home-sniff is a “search” under the Fourth Amendment and 
must be treated accordingly. 
Moreover, treatment of canine sniffs as searches would not unduly 
hamper law enforcement efforts.  While dragnet use of canine sniffs 
would be prohibited under the Federal Constitution, this practice is 
already impermissible under a number of state constitutions, 
seemingly without adverse law enforcement consequences.  Resort to 
the warrant process appropriately places a neutral magistrate in the 
decision-making role for determining whether this privacy-sensitive 
surveillance tactic should be used.  Similar to the thermal-imaging 
warrants required after Kyllo, a dog sniff warrant application would 
consider whether there was probable cause to conduct the sniff, not 
whether there was probable cause to physically search the premises.  
 
343 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62–63 (1967) (citation omitted). 
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When viewed in this light, a dog-sniff warrant would not involve an 
unreasonably burdensome showing and would provide the objectivity 
of a magistrate in considering whether this potentially intrusive police 
technique was appropriate. 
As a final thought, the Court’s recent reminder in Arizona v. 
Gant344 that extensions of constitutional rules must be supported by 
the rule’s underlying justifications has clear applicability to the canine 
home-sniff issue.  Extending Place to include canine sniffs of the 
home cannot be justified by Place’s accuracy and limited-
intrusiveness justifications.  A canine sniff of a home is not the 
minimally intrusive law enforcement tool that a sniff of luggage at an 
airport or a lawfully stopped vehicle at the roadside would represent.  
Therefore, mechanically concluding that canine sniffs are per se 
nonsearches on the basis of Place and Caballes is unreasonable. 
 
344 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1723–24 (2009) (refusing to extend Belton to allow for the search 
of a vehicle after an arrestee had been secured and therefore could not access the interior 
of the vehicle because Belton’s safety rationale was not satisfied). 
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